Atypical Actors and Tort Law\u27s Expressive Function by Best, Eli K
Marquette Law Review
Volume 96
Issue 2 Winter 2012 Article 4
Atypical Actors and Tort Law's Expressive
Function
Eli K. Best
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Marquette Law Review by an authorized administrator of Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
megan.obrien@marquette.edu.
Repository Citation
Eli K. Best, Atypical Actors and Tort Law's Expressive Function, 96 Marq. L. Rev. 461 (2012).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/mulr/vol96/iss2/4
09 BEST (DO NOT DELETE) 3/6/2013 9:33 PM 
 
ATYPICAL ACTORS AND TORT LAW’S 
EXPRESSIVE FUNCTION 
ELI K. BEST* 
The longstanding rule that tort law ignores a person’s cognitive 
disability in determining whether the person’s conduct was negligent has 
been consistently criticized as unfair and illogical.  This Article challenges 
those common criticisms.  Focusing on the law’s expressive function and 
the goals of the disability rights movement, the Article argues that the 
current rule is potentially more progressive than the alternative.  However, 
the rule’s articulated justifications may inadvertently perpetuate 
stereotypes about cognitive disability.  Thus, the Article suggests ways in 
which courts can retain the current rule without causing expressive harm. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
For at least a century, tort law has used a special standard of care to 
evaluate the conduct of people with physical disabilities and has rejected 
that kind of special standard for people with cognitive disabilities.1  
Although scholars have criticized this pattern,2 courts and the 
Restatements of Torts have maintained it based on a variety of 
rationales.3  This Article suggests that rejecting the special standard is 
justifiable on fairness and doctrinal grounds, but that the discourse 
 
1. See infra Part II.  The term “cognitive disability” is notoriously difficult to define and 
encompasses a broad range of conditions.  See, e.g., Cognitive Disabilities, DISABLED 
WORLD, http://www.disabled-world.com/disability/types/cognitive/ (last visited Oct. 14, 2012) 
[hereinafter DISABLED WORLD]; Cognitive Disabilities, WEBAIM, http://webaim.org/articles/
cognitive/ (last visited Oct. 14, 2012).  It is broader than “intellectual disability,” which 
replaced “mental retardation” in the United States Code when President Obama signed 
Rosa’s Law.  See Rosa’s Law, Pub. L. No. 111-256, 124 Stat. 2643 (codified as amended at 20 
U.S.C. § 1400 (Supp. IV 2011)).  For example, a person with autism or schizophrenia with a 
high IQ would not fall within “intellectual disability,” but would be included in “cognitive 
disability.”  The Restatements have used different language over the years.  Compare 
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 283 (1934) (using “insane person”), with RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 283B (1965) (using “insanity or other mental deficiency”), and 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM 
§ 11(c) (2010) (using “mental or emotional disability”).  
2. See, e.g., James Barr Ames, Law and Morals, 22 HARV. L. REV. 97 (1908); W.G.H. 
Cook, Mental Deficiency in Relation to Tort, 21 COLUM. L. REV. 333 (1921); William J. 
Curran, Tort Liability of the Mentally Ill and Mentally Deficient, 21 OHIO ST. L.J. 52 (1960); 
Okianer Christian Dark, Tort Liability and the “Unquiet Mind”: A Proposal to Incorporate 
Mental Disabilities into the Standard of Care, 30 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 169 (2004); Elizabeth 
J. Goldstein, Asking the Impossible: The Negligence Liability of the Mentally Ill, 12 J. 
CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 67 (1995); John V. Jacobi, Fakers, Nuts, and Federalism: 
Common Law in the Shadow of the ADA, 33 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 95 (1999); Harry J.F. 
Korrell, The Liability of Mentally Disabled Tort Defendants, 19 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 1 
(1995); David E. Seidelson, Reasonable Expectations and Subjective Standards in Negligence 
Law: The Minor, the Mentally Impaired, and the Mentally Incompetent, 50 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 17 (1981); Kristin Harlow, Note, Applying the Reasonable Person Standard to Psychosis: 
How Tort Law Unfairly Burdens Adults with Mental Illness, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 1733 (2007).  
Articles in support of the current rule are few and far between.  See, e.g., George J. 
Alexander & Thomas S. Szasz, Mental Illness as an Excuse for Civil Wrongs, 43 NOTRE 
DAME LAW. 24 (1967); Stephanie I. Splane, Note, Tort Liability of the Mentally Ill in 
Negligence Actions, 93 YALE L.J. 153 (1983).  At least one article offers brief support for the 
rule on doctrinal grounds.  See Anita Bernstein, The Communities That Make Standards of 
Care Possible, 77 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 735, 760–63 (2002).  Another argues that the objective 
standard could be used as a tool to motivate people with cognitive disabilities to seek 
treatment if a relaxed standard were offered to those that did so before they became involved 
in torts suits.  See Daniel W. Shuman, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Tort Law: A Limited 
Subjective Standard of Care, 46 SMU L. REV. 409 (1992). 
3. See infra Part II, III, and VI. 
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through which the doctrine has developed may be a source of 
inadvertent societal harm.  Thus, we should maintain the doctrine but 
pay careful attention to the social messages embedded in its current 
rationales and explore additional rationales.  By considering expressive 
effects, the heterogeneity that exists under the umbrella of cognitive 
disability, and the goals of the disability rights movement, this Article 
seeks to illuminate some complicating factors that neither opponents 
nor supporters of the current rule have thoroughly explored.  The 
Article also identifies a new rationale courts could emphasize in 
appropriate cases to bring the current doctrine into harmony with the 
goals of the disability rights movement. 
The tort system faces a difficult task in trying to craft and apply rules 
to people with various cognitive disabilities while balancing fairness, 
institutional limitations, and expressive consequences.  Neither the 
current rule that favors ignoring a person’s cognitive disability nor the 
alternative rule that would apply a relaxed standard of care is free from 
criticism.  This article suggests that the best course of action is to retain 
the current rule but to frame it differently.  Specifically, courts should 
avoid unnecessarily labeling a person as incompetent and incapable of 
acting with greater care.  Under the current rule, courts need not 
determine a person’s actual, subjective capabilities because they apply 
an objective standard.  If courts do discuss a person’s actual capabilities, 
which they do not need to, courts should recognize our uncertainty 
about the capabilities of many people with cognitive disabilities.  In 
these discussions, courts could explain that the current rule keeps open 
the possibility that a person is competent rather than labeling them as 
incompetent.  In the same vein, courts should present all accidental 
harms, whether caused by someone labeled as cognitively disabled or 
not, as potentially deterrable, as opposed to inevitable.  By making these 
subtle changes, courts will stop perpetuating the stereotype that all 
people with cognitive disabilities are incompetent and dangerous and 
soften the stigma associated with cognitive disability. 
Part II reviews the development of the common law rule and 
summarizes the past century’s academic debate.  Part III defends the 
current rule on fairness and doctrinal grounds—”first order” 
justifications.  Part IV introduces the concept of expressive 
consequences and presents some of the goals of the disability rights 
movement, setting the stage for Parts V and VI, which consider the 
expressive consequences of the oft-proposed relaxed standard and the 
expressive consequences of the current rule, as it is currently discussed 
and deployed, respectively.  Part VI goes on to suggest how courts could 
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discuss and justify the current rule to capitalize on its potential for 
expressive benefits.  Part VII addresses some potential counter-
arguments. 
II.  HISTORY OF THE DOCTRINE AND THE DEBATE 
The rule that a person’s cognitive disability is not taken into account 
when a court determines liability for negligence has a long history.  
Nearly 400 years ago, in Weaver v. Ward, the King’s Bench stated in 
dictum that “if a lunatick hurt a man, he shall be answerable in 
trespass.”4  In 1874, an American court confronted the issue in Ward v. 
Conaster.5  The evidence showed that Ward was insane when he shot 
Conaster, but the court held that “insanity cannot be looked to as a 
justification.”6  Twenty years later, the rule was extended to negligence 
cases in Williams v. Hays.7  The court found that a ship captain had been 
rendered insane by a two-day struggle to save his ship, but held that he 
was still liable for negligently refusing offers of assistance from passing 
ships.8 
Although courts embraced the rule, commentators expressed 
reservation during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.9  
The first Restatement explicitly left the issue undecided by including, as a 
caveat, that “[t]he Institute expresses no opinion as to whether insane 
persons are required to conform to the standard of behaviour which 
society demands of sane persons for the protection of the interests of 
others.”10  Similarly, after endorsing a relaxed standard of care for 
people with physical disabilities, Oliver Wendell Holmes wrote: 
Insanity is a more difficult matter to deal with, and no general 
rule can be laid down about it.  There is no doubt that in many 
cases a man may be insane, and yet perfectly capable of taking 
the precautions, and of being influenced by the motives, which 
the circumstances demand.  But if insanity of a pronounced type 
exists, manifestly incapacitating the sufferer from complying with 
the rule which he has broken, good sense would require it to be 
 
4. Weaver v. Ward, (1616) 80 Eng. Rep. 284 (K.B.) 284.  
5. Ward v. Conaster, 63 Tenn. 64 (1874).  
6. Id. at 65–66 (quoting the judge’s charge to the jury). 
7. Williams v. Hays, 38 N.E. 449 (N.Y. 1894).  
8. Id.  
9. See Splane, supra note 2, at 158–59. 
10. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 283 caveat (1934). 
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admitted as an excuse.11 
Given the uncertainty expressed in the Restatement and by 
prominent scholars, it might have appeared that the rule would soon 
give way, but that was not to be. 
When the second Restatement was published in 1965, the Reporters’ 
doubts appeared to have disappeared.12  The second Restatement 
unequivocally states that “[u]nless the actor is a child, his insanity or 
other mental deficiency does not relieve the actor from liability for 
conduct which does not conform to the standard of a reasonable man 
under like circumstances.”13  Yet, in a section on immunities later in the 
second Restatement, the Reporters add the seemingly contradictory 
comment that “in the case of negligence, the mental condition may rob 
the individual of all capacity to understand and appreciate the risk 
involved in his conduct or to take the proper precautions against that 
risk, so that there is no negligence to be found.”14  Thus, although the 
rule appeared unequivocal on its face, there may still have been doubts 
when the second Restatement was published. 
The third Restatement commits even more strongly to the rule by 
announcing that it applies with equal force whether the actor is a 
plaintiff or a defendant,15 an issue the second Restatement had left 
undecided.16  However, Comment (e) in the third Restatement notes that 
“even though the plaintiff’s mental disability is ignored in considering 
whether the plaintiff is contributorily negligent at all . . . disability can be 
considered in the course of the more open-ended process of 
apportioning percentages of responsibility between the plaintiff and the 
defendant.”17  The comment suggests that the Reporters may still be 
 
11. O.W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 109 (1881).  
12. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283B (1965). 
13. Id. 
14. Id. § 895J cmt. c.  
15. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND 
EMOTIONAL HARM § 11(c) (2010) (“An actor’s mental or emotional disability is not 
considered in determining whether conduct is negligent, unless the actor is a child.”); id. § 11 
cmt. e (“[T]he rule . . . that an actor’s mental disabilities shall be disregarded applies in the 
context of the actor’s contributory negligence as well as the context of the actor’s 
negligence.”). 
16. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 464 caveat (“The Institute expresses no 
opinion as to whether insane persons are or are not required to conform for their own 
protection to the standard of conduct which society demands of sane persons.” (emphasis 
added)).  
17. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 11 cmt. e.  
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wavering on the question of contributory negligence, but less explicitly.18 
Since the second Restatement, courts have almost universally applied 
the reasonable person standard to defendants with cognitive disabilities 
and appear to consider the matter quite settled.19  The Kansas Court of 
Appeals stated that “American courts have unanimously chosen to 
impose liability on an insane person.”20  The Florida Court of Appeals 
similarly said “[i]t has become well-settled in Florida and elsewhere 
that, as a rule, a lunatic is liable in the same generalized way as is an 
ordinary person for both ‘intentional’ acts and ‘negligent’ ones.”21 
While courts’ commitment to the rule has been firm, academic 
commentators have regularly argued that the rule is unjust, illogical, and 
outdated.22  The proposed reforms vary slightly, but essentially they call 
for the tort system to adopt a relaxed or modified objective standard.  
Critics take issue with each of the four explanations for the rule offered 
by the second Restatement. 
The second Restatement’s four explanations are: (1) it is difficult to 
draw lines between cognitive disabilities for which a relaxed standard 
might be desirable and general variations in intelligence, emotion, and 
ability for which offering a relaxed standard would eviscerate the 
 
18. As Part VII.B.1 will discuss below, courts tend to treat contributory negligence 
differently than primary negligence and apply a relaxed standard.  As such, it is questionable 
whether the third Restatement has faithfully restated the law by announcing that the 
reasonable person standard applies across the board.  
19. See, e.g., Johnson v. Lambotte, 363 P.2d 165, 166 (Colo. 1961); Creasy v. Rusk, 730 
N.E.2d 659, 661, 663 (Ind. 2000); Jankee v. Clark Cnty., 2000 WI 64, ¶ 54, 235 Wis. 2d 700, 612 
N.W.2d 297; Burch v. Am. Fam. Mut. Ins. Co., 198 Wis. 2d 465, 473–74, 543 N.W.2d 277, 280 
(1996).  Some courts have carved out narrow exceptions to the rule.  See, e.g., Gould v. Am. 
Fam. Mut. Ins. Co., 198 Wis.2d 450, 453, 543 N.W.2d 282, 283 (1996) (holding that an 
individual who is institutionalized with a mental disability, who does not have the capacity to 
control or appreciate their conduct, is not liable for injuries caused to caretakers who are paid 
employees); Breunig v. Am. Fam. Ins. Co., 45 Wis. 2d 536, 539, 543–45, 173 N.W.2d 619, 624–
25 (1970) (recognizing sudden hallucinations while driving as a possible exception).  But I 
have located only one case that explicitly rejects the Restatement.  See Fitzgerald v. Lawhorn, 
294 A.2d 338, 339 (Conn. C.P. 1972) (declaring that authority on the issue is scant and that 
the majority view is “outdated”).  Fitzgerald is a clear aberration and has since been 
overruled sub silentio in Connecticut.  See Polmatier v. Russ, 537 A.2d 468, 470–71 (Conn. 
1988) (expressing Connecticut’s agreement with the majority view).  The third Restatement 
provides that disregarding cognitive disability in considering whether a person has exercised 
reasonable care is “supported by a consistent line of modern cases” and the comment does 
not provide a counterexample.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 11 cmt. e.  
20. Williams v. Kearbey, 775 P.2d 670, 672 (Kan. Ct. App. 1989). 
21. Anicet v. Gant, 580 So. 2d 273, 275 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991).   
22. See supra note 2. 
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objective standard entirely (“line-drawing”); (2) the evidence that would 
be presented about cognitive disability is scientifically uncertain and 
there is a risk of people faking disabilities to avoid liability (“risk of 
fakery”); (3) if people with cognitive disabilities are living outside of 
institutions, they should compensate their innocent victims (“between 
two innocents”); and (4) a rule of liability will give caretakers an 
incentive to look after people with cognitive disabilities more carefully 
(“keepers’ incentives”).23 
The critics typically respond that (1) courts are often faced with 
difficult line-drawing problems and ease of adjudication should not 
trump quality of results; (2) advances in our understanding of cognitive 
disability will lead to better evidence and there is little risk of fakery due 
to the stigma associated with cognitive disability; (3) tort law is 
fundamentally based on the notion that there should generally be no 
liability without fault and it is unfair to introduce a pocket of strict 
liability for people with cognitive disabilities; and (4) many people with 
cognitive disabilities do not live with caretakers, and for those that do, 
direct liability for caretakers would be a better way to incentivize careful 
caretaking.24 
Although this Article supports applying the objective standard, it is 
only partially influenced by the Restatement’s explanations.  
Counterarguments (2) and (4) are certainly more persuasive than the 
explanations they respond to.  In fact, the third Restatement has 
removed “risk of fakery” and “keepers’ incentives” from its list of 
explanations for the current rule, but added the additional explanation 
that unlike people with physical disabilities, who can be “expected to 
adopt extra precautions to respond to the extra level of risk that the 
person creates,” people with cognitive disabilities “frequently” cannot 
“wisely and appropriately . . . moderate conduct choices.”25  As the next 
Part argues, one of the third Restatement’s justifications (“between two 
innocents”) is persuasive.26  And another (“line-drawing”) is persuasive 
in its concern with undermining the objective standard.  But the way 
they are put into operation by the courts leaves something to be 
 
23. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283B cmt. b (1965). 
24. See Jacobi, supra note 2, at 112–13 (compiling the historical use of these arguments 
in the literature).  
25. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL 
HARM § 11 cmt. e (2010).  
26. See infra Part III. 
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desired.27 
III. FIRST ORDER JUSTIFICATIONS 
This Article is largely concerned with the potential expressive 
effects28 of the current rule and a relaxed standard.  I argue that a 
relaxed standard would be undesirable on expressive grounds because it 
would carry the message that people with cognitive disabilities are 
incompetent and dangerous.  I then argue that the current rule 
unfortunately and unnecessarily sends a similar message.  I finally 
explain ways in which the current rule could be discussed and justified to 
avoid such expressive consequences. 
But before analyzing expressive consequences, the Article suggests 
that the current rule is preferable to a relaxed standard on fairness and 
doctrinal grounds, independent of expressive consequences. 
According to the third Restatement, “deinstitutionalization becomes 
more socially acceptable if innocent victims are at least assured of 
opportunity for compensation when they suffer injury.”29  Despite being 
a bit brusque and offensive in its presentation of injuries as inevitable, 
this comment embodies a simple and sound notion.  Between two 
innocent actors, the actor who caused the harm should pay.  Critics 
respond by arguing that applying the objective standard to people with 
cognitive disabilities is an unwarranted departure from the fault 
standard,30 that it unfairly creates a pocket of strict liability,31 and that 
“[t]here cannot be negligence without culpability,”32 But there are 
problems with each of these arguments. 
The argument that the current rule departs from the fault standard 
and creates an unjustifiable island of strict liability misconceives the 
fault principle, which is actually a legal fiction.  A person who is not 
“disabled” may lack the ability to conform to the reasonable person 
standard, but the tort system ignores this.33  In his classic defense of the 
objective standard, Holmes wrote: 
 
27. See infra Part VI.A.  
28. For background on the concept of expressive effects, see infra Part IV.A. 
29. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 11 cmt. e.  
30. See, e.g., Jacobi, supra note 2, at 103–04. 
31. See, e.g., Goldstein, supra note 2, at 75. 
32. See, e.g., Seidelson, supra note 2, at 37. 
33. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283B cmt. c (1965); see also 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 11 cmt. e. 
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If . . . a man is born hasty and awkward, is always having 
accidents and hurting himself or his neighbors, no doubt his 
congenital defects will be allowed for in the courts of Heaven, 
but his slips are no less troublesome to his neighbors than if they 
sprang from guilty neglect.  His neighbors accordingly require 
him, at his proper peril, to come up to their standard . . . .34 
Applying the reasonable person standard to a “hasty and awkward” 
person is no more or less like strict liability than applying it to a person 
with a cognitive disability if neither person has the ability to conform 
their conduct.35  It is the nature of the objective standard that it ignores 
whether an individual could have done better and only asks whether a 
reasonably prudent person would have done better.36  Individual 
cognitive capabilities of an actor are ignored, regardless of the labels 
attached to the actor.37 
Unless we abandon the objective, reasonable person standard 
altogether, there will always be cases in which a person is held liable 
despite the fact that he or she was incapable of acting with greater care.  
Thus, it is not sufficient to criticize the current rule simply because it 
creates “strict liability” in certain cases, unless the critic urges adopting a 
subjective standard for all actors in all cases. 
The argument that there can be no negligence without moral 
culpability is also contestable.  In negligence suits where the defendant 
truly could not have done any better, the court must decide who should 
bear the cost of the misfortune.38  Arthur Ripstein’s explanation of 
Vaughan v. Menlove, a seminal English case in which the court applied 
 
34. HOLMES, supra note 11, at 108.  As noted above, Holmes gave passing support to 
allowing a relaxed standard for “insanity,” though.  See supra text accompanying note 11.  In 
contrast to this Article, he believed it was categorically different to apply the reasonable 
person standard to someone who cannot meet it because of cognitive disability than it is to 
apply the standard to someone who cannot meet it because of inherent traits that are not 
labeled as disabilities.  HOLMES, supra note 11, at 109. 
35. See Splane, supra note 2, at 168 (“The objective standard is no more unjust to the 
mentally ill than it is to numerous other persons whose individual capacities do not quite 
match up to the capacities of the ‘ideal prudent person.’”). 
36. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283B cmt. c; see also RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF TORTS § 11 cmt. e. 
37. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283B cmt. c; see also RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF TORTS § 11 cmt. e. 
38. See ARTHUR RIPSTEIN, EQUALITY, RESPONSIBILITY, AND THE LAW 84 (1999) 
(“Because of the binary structure of adjudication—because it had to be somebody’s bad 
luck—the court had to decide whose it was.”).  
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the reasonable person standard over the defendant’s contention that he 
had honestly acted to the best of his judgment,39 is helpful: 
Had the court relieved Menlove of responsibility . . . they would 
have been treating Menlove himself as a mere natural thing 
rather than as an agent. . . . 
 Put slightly differently, although we hesitate to blame 
Menlove for his incapacity, we hold him liable because the risk 
that he imposed on Vaughan was rightly his.  We hold him liable 
without supposing him to be morally tainted because a fair 
distribution of risks requires that the risk lie with him.40 
Ripstein is not alone in rejecting the notion that tort liability 
requires moral culpability.  Jules Coleman similarly argues that “[f]ault 
liability in torts, especially liability for negligence . . . does not require 
culpability or moral blameworthiness.”41  For these theorists, tort law is 
concerned with losses, not wrongs—it hinges on “moral responsibility 
for a loss one has caused, rather than responsibility for having 
committed a wrong.”42  While it still may seem unfortunate for a person 
who truly could not have done any better to face liability, this “does not 
lead to the conclusion that [the other party] should not be allowed to 
recover.”43 
For these reasons, the criticisms of the Restatement’s “between two 
innocents” justification are largely unpersuasive.  As a matter of fairness 
and doctrinal coherence, it seems appropriate for the person who caused 
harm to bear responsibility for the harm regardless of whether the 
person actually could have acted differently. 
The third Restatement also justifies the current rule by expressing 
concern about courts’ ability to sensibly draw lines between cognitive 
disabilities that are causally connected to unreasonable conduct and 
those that are “not especially important as an explanation for 
conduct.”44  There are two traditional critiques of this justification: first, 
 
39. Vaughan v. Menlove, (1837) 132 Eng. Rep. 490 (C.P.), 3 Bing. (N.C.) 468.   
40. RIPSTEIN, supra note 38, at 85 (emphasis added). 
41. JULES L. COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS 219 (1992).  
42. See John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Torts as Wrongs, 88 TEX. L. REV. 
917, 926 (2010) (original emphasis omitted) (emphasis added) (discussing corrective justice 
theorists’ distinction between losses and wrongs).  
43. RIPSTEIN, supra note 38, at 87.  For more on the practical effects of financial liability, 
see infra Part VII.C. 
44. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND 
EMOTIONAL HARM § 11 cmt. e (2010).   
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improved scientific understandings of cognitive disability make it 
possible to draw lines coherently, and second, courts draw difficult lines 
all the time and more appropriate results should not be sacrificed in the 
name of administrability.45 
The first of these critiques has some appeal.  Courts, with the 
assistance of expert witnesses, are now capable of assessing the 
relationship between a person’s cognitive abilities and their conduct.46  
The Restatement therefore probably overstates the difficulty courts 
would have determining whether a cognitive disability caused a person’s 
conduct.  The second critique, however, hinges on the assumption that a 
relaxed standard would lead to appropriate results because it is 
unacceptable to impose liability on a person who could not have done 
any better.  As aulluded to earlier in this Part ccepting this critique 
would pose a fundamental problem for the tort system, alluded to 
above.   
The problem is that it is difficult to defend allowing a relaxed 
standard for people of certain cognitive ability levels while maintaining 
the objective reasonable person standard for others.  Disability rights 
activists stress that “[a]s a ‘natural’ matter, abilities lie on a spectrum.”47  
If a relaxed standard were warranted because a person’s cognitive 
disability prevented him or her from exercising adequate care, why 
would a relaxed standard not be warranted when a person is simply 
“hasty or awkward” and incapable of exercising adequate care for that 
reason?  In other words, if courts were to allow a relaxed standard, the 
standard should not be available only in cases where an actor’s disability 
rendered the conduct unavoidable.  It should be available any time an 
actor’s cognitive abilities, whether earning the label “disability” or not, 
rendered the person incapable of exercising adequate care. 
The tort system has long expressed a preference against considering 
the subjective capabilities of individual actors.48  Allowing a relaxed 
standard for people with cognitive disabilities would conflict with this 
fundamental principle.  If courts made a subtle inquiry into whether an 
 
45. See Jacobi, supra note 2, at 112. 
46. In other contexts, such as criminal law and contract law, courts regularly make such 
determinations.  See infra Part VII.B.2. 
47. See, e.g., Samuel R. Bagenstos & Margo Schlanger, Hedonic Damages, Hedonic 
Adaptation, and Disability, 60 VAND. L. REV. 745, 779 (2007).  
48. See, e.g., Vaughan v. Menlove, (1837) 132 Eng. Rep. 490, 492 (C.P.), 3 Bing. (N.C.) 
468 (holding the defendant liable for damages caused by a fire despite his arguments that he 
was subjectively unable to exercise better judgment or more caution).   
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individual’s cognitive disability prevented the person from exercising 
adequate care in a particular circumstance, it would be difficult to justify 
not making the same inquiry for all parties that claim they could not 
have done better, whether they have a disability or not.  Thus, even 
though the Restatement’s concern about courts’ capacity to draw lines 
may be overstated, it does not follow that it would be desirable for 
courts to draw the proposed lines. 
Some readers may push back against the contention that everyone’s 
ability levels lie on a spectrum and argue that a person either has or 
does not have a cognitive disability.  This article does not intend to deny 
the existence of disability.  Whether cognitive disabilities are 
physiologically discernable or not, there is no doubt that they are real 
conditions, with real effects.49  Nonetheless, if the tort system were to 
allow a relaxed standard based on a party’s cognitive abilities, a party’s 
access to it should not necessarily hinge on whether he or she is 
classified as “disabled.”50 
Despite plausible counter-arguments, considerations of fairness and 
doctrinal coherence both support the current rule.  The rest of this 
Article addresses another variable, expressive effects, which should not 
be overlooked in this context. 
IV. EXPRESSIVISM AND THE GOALS OF THE DISABILITY RIGHTS 
MOVEMENT 
Before discussing the expressive effects of the current rule and the 
often-proposed relaxed standard, there are two more preliminary tasks.  
First, I briefly summarize expressivist scholarship, a body of scholarship 
 
49. Even strong supporters of the social model of disability acknowledge that disability 
and difference are real.  See, e.g., MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: 
INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND AMERICAN LAW 111 (1990) (“A focus on social relations casts 
doubt on the notion that difference is located solely in the person who is different.” (emphasis 
added)); Bagenstos & Schlanger, supra note 47, at 779 (“Although impairments plainly 
impose limits, it is not the impairment alone that has disabled her . . . .”); Samuel R. 
Bagenstos, Subordination, Stigma, and “Disability,” 86 VA. L. REV. 397, 430–31 (2000) 
(“[T]he disability rights argument is not that disability is entirely a social creation . . . .”). 
50. The torts system does allow a relaxed standard for some groups of people—notably, 
people with physical disabilities and children.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: 
LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM §§ 10, 11 (2010).  It is beyond the scope 
of this Article to explore whether these apparent inconsistencies are justifiable, and if not, 
whether the rule for these other categories should mirror the rule for cognitive disabilities.  
An interesting aspect of such discussion would be to consider whether the risks of expressive 
harm outlined in Parts V and VI, below, apply in similar ways to people with physical 
disabilities. 
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that focuses on the social messages that are conveyed by laws.  Second, I 
examine the goals of the disability rights movement, in order to set forth 
some of the messages that courts would ideally convey when they apply 
tort doctrines. 
A. Expressivism 
In recent decades, a growing body of legal scholarship has analyzed 
the expressive function of law.51  These articles explain “the function of 
law in ‘making statements’ as opposed to controlling behavior directly” 52 
and explore ways in which “law affects behavior other than through 
sanctions.”53  Dan Kahan has argued that society should conceive of 
criminal punishment as a language.54  In other words, we should be 
aware that punishments do more than dictate the literal, concrete 
consequences for defendants.55  They also express meaning and convey 
specific messages about society’s values and norms.56  To separate the 
consequences from the embedded meaning is to ignore an important 
aspect of a punishment.57  Richard Pildes has made similar arguments 
with respect to social insurance programs.58  Expressive theories have 
been applied to a range of laws, from those requiring motorcycle users 
to wear helmets,59 to the Americans with Disabilities Act.60 
 
51. See, e.g., Elizabeth S. Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A 
General Restatement, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 1503, 1504 (2000); Alex Geisinger, A Belief Change 
Theory of Expressive Law, 88 IOWA L. REV. 35, 40 (2002); Dan M. Kahan, What Do 
Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 591 (1996); Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation 
of Social Meaning, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 943, 951 (1995); Richard H. McAdams, An Attitudinal 
Theory of Expressive Law, 79 OR. L. REV. 339, 341 (2000); Richard H. Pildes, The Unintended 
Cultural Consequences of Public Policy: A Comment on the Symposium, 89 MICH. L. REV. 
936, 938 (1991); Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 
2021, 2024 (1996).  This line of scholarship has not been received positively by everyone.  See 
Matthew D. Adler, Expressive Theories of Law: A Skeptical Overview, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 
1363 (2000).  
52. Sustein, supra note 51, at 2024.  
53. Geisinger, supra note 51, at 40. 
54. See Kahan, supra note 51, at 594. 
55. See id. at 597. 
56. See id.   
57. See id. at 653. 
58. See Pildes, supra note 51, at 942 (“Public programs . . . do not just do things in the 
sense of providing benefits or offering services.  They also mean something . . . .”).  
59. See Lessig, supra note 51, at 964–65. 
60. See Dov Fox & Christopher L. Griffin, Jr., Disability-Selective Abortion and the 
Americans with Disabilities Act, 2009 UTAH L. REV. 845, 848–59.  
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While expressivist scholarship tends to focus on how laws encourage 
or discourage particular behaviors by changing the public’s beliefs about 
that behavior,61 the expressive function of law could also change the 
public’s beliefs about a group of people.  Further, it is not merely the 
substantive rules of law that can alter public beliefs about a group of 
people, but also the ways in which the substantive rules of law are 
discussed and justified.  Alex Geisinger has highlighted the importance 
of looking beyond the mere existence of a law to find its true expressive 
meaning: 
Law can more directly affect the certainty with which a belief 
is held by providing information or by influencing the inferential 
reasoning process.  Note, however, that, in terms of its ability to 
provide information, the passage of a law itself may not be the 
main source of information.  Rather, publicity about the reasons 
for the passage of a law will be the main source of information 
provision.62 
In a recent article, Samuel Bagenstos and Margo Schlanger analyzed 
the expressive effects of providing compensatory damages for disabling 
injuries.63  They argue persuasively that the way in which damages for 
disabling injuries are framed and discussed can have a powerful impact 
on societal perceptions of disability.64  Awards of equal size can carry 
different meanings.  On the one hand, “[a]warding damages for the out-
of-pocket costs of medical care, rehabilitation, assistive technology, and 
personal assistance . . . merely recognize[s] concrete obstacles . . . that 
money can overcome.”65  On the other hand, “[a]warding damages for 
the supposed hedonic loss inherent in disability sends the opposite 
message, that disability . . . makes one’s life less happy, and that there is 
nothing society can do but take pity on those who are disabled and 
throw some charity their way.”66 
The expressive effects of applying the objective reasonable person 
standard to people with cognitive disabilities are not explicitly 
considered in any of the Restatements’ comments and have not been 
 
61. See supra note 51. 
62. Geisinger, supra note 51, at 63. 
63. See Bagenstos & Schlanger, supra note 47, at 752–60. 
64. Id. at 778–84. 
65. Id. at 784. 
66. Id. 
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thoroughly addressed in the literature.67  Like Bagenstos and Schlanger, 
I argue that changes in discourse that do not affect how much money 
changes hands can have powerful effects by conveying more progressive 
messages about disability.  Instead of just focusing on the existence of a 
law on the books, I consider how the law is discussed, justified, and 
deployed.  On the topic of applying the objective standard to people 
with cognitive disabilities, publicity about the reasons for the doctrinal 
choice will come from judges in their opinions, from jury instructions, 
from the Restatement’s reporters, and from academics. 
B.  The Goals of the Disability Rights Movement 
Compared to the civil rights movements of women and African-
Americans, the disability rights movement is young and much less 
visible.68  “The nation has heard the arguments and learned the ideology 
of rights as applied to blacks, [and] to women,” but disability rights are 
dramatically less present in the public consciousness.69  Less than one 
hundred years ago, the Supreme Court confidently ruled eight to one in 
favor of involuntary sterilization of the “feeble-minded.”70  Justice 
Holmes declared: “It is better for all the world, if instead of waiting to 
execute degenerate offspring for crime, or to let them starve for their 
imbecility, society can prevent those who are manifestly unfit from 
continuing their kind. . . .  Three generations of imbeciles are enough.”71  
It was not until 1990, decades after the passage the Civil Rights Act of 
1964, that the law recognized that “people with disabilities are . . . equal 
citizens” with the passage of the Americans with Disabilities Act.72  And 
many contend that this landmark legislation has failed to achieve its 
 
67. Two pieces lend support to the objective standard on somewhat similar grounds, and 
this article builds on those pieces.  See Alexander & Szasz, supra note 2; Splane, supra note 2.  
68. See MARY JOHNSON, MAKE THEM GO AWAY: CLINT EASTWOOD, CHRISTOPHER 
REEVE & THE CASE AGAINST DISABILITY RIGHTS 23 (2003) (“There was a disability rights 
movement.  But it was hard to find it . . . . Unlike [Jesse] Jackson or [Ms. Magazine’s Gloria] 
Steinem, there was no ‘name’ anyone knew and associated with disability rights; no NOW; no 
N.A.A.C.P.”); see also DORIS ZAMES FLEISCHER & FRIEDA ZAMES, THE DISABILITY 
RIGHTS MOVEMENT: FROM CHARITY TO CONFRONTATION xvi (2001); RICHARD K. 
SCOTCH, FROM GOOD WILL TO CIVIL RIGHTS: TRANSFORMING FEDERAL DISABILITY 
POLICY 5–7 (2d ed. 2001). 
69. See JOHNSON, supra note 68, at 43. 
70. See Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927). 
71. Id. at 207 (citation ommitted).  
72. SAMUEL R. BAGENSTOS, LAW AND THE CONTRADICTIONS OF THE DISABILITY 
RIGHTS MOVEMENT 1 (2009).   
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goals.73  In a sense, disability rights are just beginning to emerge.74  They 
are vulnerable to being undermined by outright antagonism or 
unconscious ignorance.  Because of the relative youth and lack of 
prominence of the disability rights movement, judges may be more 
likely to inadvertently engage in discourse that is damaging to its goals.   
The Part above, discussing expressivism, argued that laws send 
messages about people with cognitive disabilities and have an impact on 
societal perceptions.  It explained that changing substantive laws is one 
way to send different messages, but that judges and commentators can 
also change the practical impact of a law without changing the law itself 
by discussing the law with different language and justifying it with 
different rationales.  Recognizing this power, the next step is to 
determine exactly what messages the law should send with respect to 
people with cognitive disabilities.  In the specific case of applying the 
objective standard (or a relaxed standard) of care to people with 
cognitive disabilities, this preliminary matter is more complicated than it 
might seem because the goals of the disability rights movement are 
multifaceted and not universally embraced, even among people with 
disabilities.  
In a recent book, Bagenstos writes the following regarding the goals 
of the disability rights movement: 
[I]t is an oversimplification to speak of the ‘goals of the disability 
rights movement’ as if the term referred to some stable and 
uncontroversially defined category.  It makes more sense . . . to 
speak of the disability rights movement as having various 
projects—projects that are interconnected, though sometimes in 
tension, and that are emphasized in different ways and to 
different degrees by different movement participants at different 
times.75 
A few of these projects are particularly relevant to determining what 
standard the tort system should apply to people with cognitive 
disabilities and how it should be implemented and justified.  
 
73. See, e.g., RUTH COLKER, THE DISABILITY PENDULUM: THE FIRST DECADE OF THE 
AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT 6–8 (2005); see also BAGENSTOS, supra note 72, at 1 
(“ADA plaintiffs lose their cases at astounding rates—the only litigants less successful than 
ADA employment plaintiffs are prisoner plaintiffs . . . .”).   
74. See BAGENSTOS, supra note 72, at 13–18 (describing the beginnings of the disability 
rights movement). 
75. Id. at 12.  For an overview of many “projects” of the disability rights movement, see 
id. at 12–33. 
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1. A Social Model 
The desire to shift social perceptions of disability from a “medical 
model” to a “social model” is the “one position that approaches 
consensus within the [disability rights] movement.”76  The once-
dominant medical model of disability treats disability as “an inherent 
personal characteristic that should ideally be fixed,” “encourages 
dependence on doctors . . . and charity[,]” and “stigmatizes people with 
disabilities, by defining them as something less than normal[.]”77  On the 
other hand, a social model of disability sees disability as “a condition 
that results from the interaction between some physical or mental 
characteristic labeled as an ‘impairment’ and the contingent decisions 
that have made physical and social structures inaccessible to people with 
that condition.”78  The social model does not ignore the social choices 
that lead to the exclusion of people with disabilities.  It “treats existing 
institutional arrangements as a conceivable source of the 
problem . . . rather than as an unproblematic background.”79 
As Bagenstos and Schlanger put it, “[a]s a ‘natural’ matter, abilities 
lie on a spectrum; it is social choices that make some limitations on some 
abilities ‘disabling’ and others not.”80  For example, “[a] person who uses 
a wheelchair . . . is disabled only because so many buildings, sidewalks, 
and modes of transportation are inaccessible, and because so many 
people have negative attitudes toward people who use wheelchairs.”81 
That being said, it is crucial to make clear that the social model does 
not deny that disabilities impose limitations.82  The social model simply 
highlights that the extent to which these limitations are actually 
disabling is not inherent to the person with the disability, but is created 
by the interaction between the physical or mental limitations and 
societal choices and attitudes.83 
 
76. Id. at 13.  For additional discussions of the history of the medical model and the 
development of the social model, see, for example, Mary Crossley, The Disability 
Kaleidoscope, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 621, 649–65 (1999); and Laura L. Rovner, Disability, 
Equality, and Identity, 55 ALA. L. REV. 1043, 1047–58 (2004). 
77. BAGENSTOS, supra note 72, at 18. 
78. Id.; see also Harlan Hahn, Accommodations and the ADA: Unreasonable Bias or 
Biased Reasoning?, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 166, 173 (2000).  
79. MINOW, supra note 49, at 112. 
80. Bagenstos & Schlanger, supra note 47, at 779. 
81. Id. 
82. See supra note 49. 
83. See Bagenstos, supra note 49, at 426. 
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2. Inclusion, Integration, and Independence 
Another important project, or group of projects, of the disability 
rights movement is for people with disabilities to be included and 
integrated into general society84 and for people with disabilities to live 
independent, autonomous lives.85  On inclusion and integration, Joseph 
Shapiro writes: 
[I]n a society where disabled people are remote, we have not 
understood the need to adjust attitudes, programs, and laws to fit 
the changing reality of disabled people who now seek 
independence. 
As a result, integration—into the work force, the classroom, 
the community—has become a primary goal of today’s disability 
movement.86 
Independence and autonomy are complicated goals within the 
disability rights movement, primarily because they are in tension with 
the need for assistance that is a reality in the lives of many people with 
disabilities.87  However, it is possible to both live an autonomous, 
independent life and receive required assistance.88  Bagenstos explains: 
Even if people with disabilities require assistance in personal 
hygiene, transportation, or other activities in order to live in the 
community[,] . . . that need not compromise their independence.  
Rather, independent living advocates believe that such assistance 
actually promotes independence, so long as those who provide 
the assistance are subject to the control and direction of the 
individuals with disabilities who receive it.89 
The ideals of inclusion, integration, independence, and autonomy 
are closely linked and complex.  While we consider the expressive 
effects of an objective or relaxed standard, we should keep these goals 
in mind. 
 
84. See JOSEPH P. SHAPIRO, NO PITY: PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES FORGING A NEW 
CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 142–83 (1993). 
85. See BAGENSTOS, supra note 72, at 22–33.  
86. SHAPIRO, supra note 84, at 144.  
87. BAGENSTOS, supra note 72, at 22–33 (discussing the history of the independence goal 
within the disability rights movement).  The assistance required obviously differs from person 
to person, but it covers broad territory, from assistance with activities like getting dressed, to 
financial assistance in the form of government benefits.  
88. Id. at 25. 
89. Id. 
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3. Presuming Competence 
There is substantial uncertainty about the capabilities of people with 
cognitive disabilities.  For example, consider our developing 
understanding of autism.  It was long believed that people with 
“classical” or “severe” autism were incapable of communication, 
interaction, or introspection.90  However, using various methods of 
facilitated communication91 some people who were presumed illiterate 
have gained literacy and even become advocates—raising awareness of 
their abilities and their struggles.92 
Acknowledging this uncertainty, disability rights activists urge 
society to adopt a presumption of competence in situations where 
science and experience leave us in doubt about a person’s capabilities.93  
The notion is simply that there is less harm in presuming potential 
competence in the face of uncertain capabilities than presuming 
incompetence.94  A presumption of competence leads to more sincere 
efforts to foster the capabilities of people with cognitive disabilities.95  
The opposite presumption allows people to write off these efforts as 
useless.96 
Ralph Savarese argues that “[p]erhaps there’s just a subset of people 
with ‘classical’ autism who can communicate, but let’s find this out after 
we’ve adopted different assumptions and devoted ourselves to the task 
 
90. See RALPH JAMES SAVARESE, REASONABLE PEOPLE: A MEMOIR OF AUTISM & 
ADOPTION xii–xiv (2007). 
91. Traditionally, facilitated communication is a technique where a facilitator supports 
or holds the hand of a person who cannot speak and struggles to communicate to help them 
type.  The technique has been shrouded in controversy, but is gaining acceptance.  See id. at 
xx–xxiii. 
92. For a discussion of traditional conceptions of autism and some of the people with 
autism who have gained literacy, see id. at xi–xxxi. 
93. See Douglas Biklen & Jamie Burke, Presuming Competence, 39 EQUITY & 
EXCELLENCE IN EDUC. 166, 166 (2006) (discussing “the importance of presuming competence 
of students with disabilities”).  
94. See id. (“Yet with children classified as autistic, it is not uncommon to link early 
expressive difficulties to a presumption of incompetence.”).  
95. See id. at 167 (“[Presuming competence] is actually the more conservative choice.  It 
refuses to limit opportunity; by presuming competence, it casts the teachers, parents, and 
others in the role of finding ways to support the person to demonstrate his or her agency.”). 
96. See id. (“The very student who has difficulties with performance, including speech, 
will often be caught in the diagnostic category of severely retarded, not because of any proof 
about thinking ability, but because of an absence of evidence about his or her thinking ability.  
Hence the student may be defined as unable to benefit from inclusion.”).  
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of developing potential.”97 
Some might think that a strong presumption of competence sounds 
like denial of difference, which could be detrimental to people with 
cognitive disabilities.  But there seems to be less harm in erring on the 
side of presuming competence than in foreclosing the possibility.  This 
concept will prove central to analyzing the expressive effects of the legal 
standard we choose. 
4. The Universal Model and the Minority Group Model 
The general consensus that a social model is preferable to a medical 
model, discussed above, has “masked some significant tensions that 
remain within the [disability rights] movement.”98  One of those tensions 
is between a universal model and a minority group model of disability 
and disability policy.99  Adherents to a universal model “declare that the 
disability label is arbitrary and useless.”100  As Bagenstos explains: 
[The universalist position] might see people with socially 
identified disabilities as canaries in the coal mine, whose 
incompatibility with existing physical or social structures calls 
our attention to problems that all individuals can face . . . .  But 
the proper response would not be disability specific—it would be 
the universal design of the built environment to embrace the 
largest variety of potential users . . . .101 
On the other hand, the minority group model accepts the socially 
defined category of disability and supports policies that “direct 
resources and accommodations at that group” because, while the 
boundaries may be arbitrary and socially constructed, only the group 
that is labeled disabled is targeted with “prejudice, stereotypes, and 
neglect.”102  Both of these models help explain and justify the current 
doctrine. 
Before continuing, an important caveat is in order regarding the 
various projects of the disability rights movement. 
There is substantial heterogeneity enveloped in the term “cognitive 
 
97. SAVARESE, supra note 90, at xx.  
98. BAGENSTOS, supra note 72, at 20.  
99. Id. at 20–21. 
100. Id. at 21. 
101. Id. 
102. Id. at 20–21. 
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disability.”103  Even within a particular disability, there is substantial 
heterogeneity in ability levels, attitudes, and goals.104  As a result, none 
of the above-mentioned projects are universally embraced.   
The clash between various autism groups is a compelling example.  
Groups like “Autism Research Institute”105 and “Autism Speaks”106 
advocate researching treatments or a cure for autism.  These groups 
think of autism as a disease that might one day be eradicated.107  On the 
other hand, “The Autistic Self Advocacy Network”108 embraces the 
tenets of the disability rights movement and argues that “the goal of 
autism advocacy should not be a world without Autistic people.  
Instead, it should be a world in which Autistic people enjoy the same 
access, rights and opportunities as all other citizens.”109  “Autism 
Network International” has a similar perspective.110 
These drastically divergent attitudes among people with the same 
disability, along with the divergent attitudes held by people with 
different disabilities, call into question tort law’s ability to send 
appropriate messages with a single rule that applies equally to any actor 
with any “mental or emotional disability.”111  For example, should a 
 
103. See DISABLED WORLD, supra note 1. 
104. See id. 
 105.  See About Our Work, AUTISM RESEARCH INST., http://www.autism.com/index.php
/about-ari (last visited Oct. 20, 2012). 
106. See About Us: Mission, AUTISM SPEAKS, http://www.autismspeaks.org/about-
us/mission (last visited Oct. 20, 2012). 
107. See id. 
108. See AUTISTIC SELF ADVOCACY NETWORK, http://autisticadvocacy.org/ (last visited 
Oct. 17, 2012). 
109. Cheryl M. Jorgensen, From One Ally to the Education Community: A New View of 
Students with Autism, AUTISTIC SELF ADVOCACY NETWORK (April 27, 2012), http://autistic
advocacy.org/2012/04/from-one-ally-to-the-education-community-a-new-view-of-students-
with-autism/ (quoting Ari Ne’eman, founder of The Autism Self-Advocacy Network).  
110. See Autism Network International, Introducing ANI, AUTREAT.COM, 
http://www.autreat.com/intro.html (last modified July 29, 2012) (“Supports for autistic people 
should be aimed at helping them to compensate, navigate, and function in the world, not at 
changing them into non-autistic people or isolating them from the world.”).  It is not only 
people with autism who hold this view, “People First” is “an organisation run by and for 
people with learning difficulties,” PEOPLE FIRST, http://peoplefirstltd.com (last visited Oct. 
17, 2012), that “promotes the social model of disability,” Info and FAQ, PEOPLE FIRST, 
http://peoplefirstltd.com/about-us/info-faq/ (last visited Oct. 17, 2012). 
111. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL 
HARM § 11(c) (2010).  While it is not the focus of this Article, the heterogeneity and 
divergent attitudes described above are not limited to people with cognitive disabilities.  For 
example, some people with deafness happily attempt to “cure” their condition with cochlear 
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person with schizophrenia, who may consider him- or herself diseased, 
not disabled, and be perfectly amenable to notions of a “cure,” 
necessarily be governed by the same rule as a person with autism or 
Down syndrome who conceives of his or her disability as an integral part 
of his or her personhood?112  Given this heterogeneity, it seems 
inevitable that the messages sent by the tort system will not be a perfect 
fit for everyone.  The question is which rule has the most potential for 
beneficial expressive effects. 
With this introduction to expressivism and the disability rights 
movement complete, I now move to the specific issue at hand—the 
expressive consequences of applying the objective reasonable person 
standard (and of applying a relaxed standard) to people with cognitive 
disabilities.  The Article first addresses the problematic expressive 
consequences of a relaxed standard.  It then discusses the expressive 
consequences of the current rule as it is currently justified by courts and 
the Restatement and concludes that any potential that the current rule 
may have for expressive benefits is lost in the delivery.  Finally, the 
Article explains the potential expressive benefits of a shift in discourse 
regarding the current rule. 
V. EXPRESSIVE CONSEQUENCES OF A RELAXED STANDARD 
Just as the imposition of punishment or liability contains embedded 
messages, a decision to withhold liability can speak volumes.  A relaxed 
standard would lead to less liability for people with cognitive disabilities, 
which at first blush might seem to send a positive message.  But for 
people with certain disabilities and attitudes, the messages contained 
within the relaxed standard and the litigation strategies the relaxed 
standard would encourage could be damaging. 
There are brief endorsements of the current rule scattered 
throughout commentary on the law of torts,113 but these endorsements 
do not consider the rule’s effect on the disabled community, focusing 
instead on fairness to the opposition and economic efficiency.114  The 
 
implants, while other members of the Deaf community “reject the very idea of trying to find a 
‘cure’ for deafness.  Indeed they have compared it to genocide.”  Robert Sparrow, Defending 
Deaf Culture: The Case of Cochlear Implants, 13 J. POL. PHIL. 135, 135 (2005).  
112. Cf. BAGENSTOS, supra note 72, at 50 (discussing the variety of ways people deemed 
“disabled” may identify themselves).  
113. See, e.g., WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC 
STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 127–28 (1987); RIPSTEIN, supra note 38, at 84–87.  
114. See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 113, at 127–28 (arguing that the current rule is 
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limited literature that explores the expressive effects of the current rule 
concentrates on a simple theme: if the tort system allowed a relaxed 
standard for actors with cognitive disabilities, it would label them as 
incompetent, incomplete human beings in a manner inconsistent with 
modern goals of inclusion and integration.115  In other words, a relaxed 
standard that led to less liability for people with cognitive disabilities 
would undermine inclusion and integration. 
The notion that applying the objective standard to people with 
cognitive disabilities aids integration and inclusion has been criticized 
because it is “improbable . . . that individuals will choose harm and 
potential tort recovery over ex ante avoidance of the harm.”116  This 
criticism is almost certainly valid.  It is far-fetched to assume that very 
many people would decide how to engage with a person with a cognitive 
disability based on whether they will have an opportunity to sue the 
person for negligence if they are harmed.117  However, the inclusion 
argument need not rest on the questionable claim that a possibility of ex 
post compensation influences individual decisionmakers. 
The objective standard has the power to aid inclusion efforts not 
because potential compensation will immediately motivate people to be 
more inclusive, but because the expressive consequences of the 
objective standard may play a role in slowly changing widely held 
stereotypes and misconceptions about people with cognitive 
disabilities.118  In this Part, I discuss how the expressive consequences of 
a relaxed standard would undermine this project. 
 
justifiable because it reduces administrative costs and because it protects the public against 
“highly dangerous—one might say ultrahazardous”—insane people).  This instrumental 
approach seems undesirable on expressive grounds because it dehumanizes actors by treating 
them as vehicles for maximizing social welfare. 
115. See Alexander & Szasz, supra note 2, at 35 (“[T]o deny a person the legal capacity 
to form intentional acts for which he is held responsible is to diminish, or even deny, his status 
as a full-fledged human being.”); Splane, supra note 2, at 167 (arguing that holding the 
mentally ill liable avoids “treating the mentally ill as a special sub-class of inept citizens who 
cannot be blamed or held accountable for socially undesirable conduct”).  
116. See Goldstein, supra note 2, at 89; see also id. at 88 (“[A]ctors may rationally choose 
to forgo the possibility of harm by not interacting with the mentally ill.”).  
117. One can perhaps imagine a landlord or an employer who might feel better about 
renting to or hiring a person with a cognitive disability because of this rule, though it is a bit 
far-fetched to think this consideration would push someone from discriminating to including. 
118. Reshaping societal perceptions is undoubtedly a tall task and I do not mean to 
overstate the potential benefits of the change in discourse I propose.  Even the ADA, which 
was a historic and large-scale legislative proclamation, has proven unable to alleviate many of 
the problems it was intended to address.  See, e.g., COLKER, supra note 73. 
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A relaxed standard would likely track the Second Restatement’s rule 
for actors with physical disabilities.119  The hypothetical §11(c) of the 
third Restatement would read: “The conduct of an actor with a mental or 
emotional disability is negligent only if the conduct does not conform to 
that of a reasonably careful person with the same disability.”  Under any 
variation of this rule,120 the courts’ analysis would essentially focus on 
whether or not the person acted in a way we consider reasonable for a 
person in his or her situation, given what we know and understand 
about the disability.  There are several reasons to resist this scenario. 
A. Underestimation of Capability 
The first problem with applying a relaxed standard to people with 
cognitive disabilities is that if judges and juries121 were asked to 
determine if the conduct of a person with a cognitive disability was 
reasonable for a person with such a disability, there is a risk that they 
would too readily presume incompetence.  Many people, including 
judges, tend to underestimate the potential of people with cognitive 
disabilities.122  Bagenstos and Schlanger provide the powerful example of 
Nicholas Romeo.123  Romeo, the plaintiff in a Fourteenth Amendment 
case that reached the Supreme Court,124 was living in an institution at the 
time of his case and was described by the Court as “profoundly 
retarded” and as having “the mental capacity of an 18-month-old child, 
with an I.Q. between 8 and 10.”125  His own counsel stated that “no 
 
119. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283C (1965) (“If the actor is ill or 
otherwise physically disabled, the standard of conduct to which he must conform to avoid 
being negligent is that of a reasonable man under like disability.”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) 
OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 11(a) (2010) (“The conduct 
of an actor with a physical disability is negligent only if the conduct does not conform to that 
of a reasonably careful person with the same disability.”). 
120. See, e.g., Dark, supra note 2, at 207 (“[W]here the mental illness has a verifiable 
physical origin that is a significant factor in the diagnosis and treatment of the person, that 
person should have the benefit of the physical disability rule in evaluating his or her 
conduct . . . .”); Jacobi, supra note 2, at 115–18 (proposing a ‘“reasonably prudent insane 
person’ standard” that categorizes mental illnesses as “[s]udden onset—no warning[,]” 
“[c]hronic serious mental illness, controlled (at least in part) by treatment[,]” or “[c]hronic 
severe mental illness, uncontrolled”). 
121. Presumably, judges would need to decide whether to allow the relaxed standard 
and how to instruct juries, then juries would try to apply it. 
122. See, e.g., Bagenstos & Schlanger, supra note 47, at 782–83. 
123. Id. at 782–83 n.177. 
124. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 314 (1982). 
125. Id. at 309. 
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amount of training will make possible his release.”126  However, less than 
a year after the decision, Romeo moved to a community residence and 
was working part-time in his neighborhood.127  The scope of the Court 
and Romeo’s counsel’s misconception is striking.128 
Because many jurisdictions apply a relaxed standard in negligence 
cases when the person with the cognitive disability is a plaintiff,129 we can 
get some sense of whether courts accurately assess the capabilities of 
people with cognitive disabilities.  In Mochen v. State, a 17-year-old with 
a history of psychosis was injured while trying to escape from a second-
story window of a mental institution using bed sheets.130  Although 
doctors hired by the plaintiff and the State disagreed about whether the 
plaintiff was capable of resisting an opportunity to escape, they agreed 
that he “could perceive the risk resulting from going out of the 
window.”131  Nonetheless, the court declared that “his emotional 
development was that of a young child and he was unable to 
comprehend the possible consequences from the attempt to exit the 
second story window.”132  By underestimating this plaintiff’s capabilities, 
the court labeled him as incompetent and dangerous.133  As the public 
absorbs this message, people are likely to become more wary of 
 
126. Id. at 317.  
127. Timothy M. Cook, The Americans with Disabilities Act: The Move to Integration, 64 
TEMP. L. REV. 393, 443 (1991).  
128. It is possible that Romeo’s lawyers strategically downplayed his capabilities as 
opposed to inadvertently underestimating them.  If this is the case, it is illustrative of a 
separate problem that would arise if the relaxed standard were available.  See infra notes 161–
73 and accompanying text.   
129. For a discussion of this somewhat puzzling, but arguably defensible, doctrine, see 
infra Part VII.B.1.  
130. Mochen v. State, 352 N.Y.S.2d 290, 292 (App. Div. 1974). 
131. Id. at 295. 
132. Id.  In fact, the court was confident enough in this assessment that it overruled a 
lower court’s contrary finding, despite the factual nature of the determination calling for 
deferential review.  Id. 
133. It is worth noting that in contributory negligence cases courts may, out of sympathy, 
ascribe less competence to plaintiffs with cognitive disabilities so that they can recover.  It 
does not necessarily follow that the court would assess the actor’s competence in the same 
way when he is a defendant.  Additionally, the court in Mochen may have been lashing out 
against the harshness of contributory negligence, which was still the regime of choice in New 
York in 1974 but was quickly falling out of favor.  See Harry A. Gair, The Contributory 
Negligence Rule: An Offense to Justice (Part I), 35 N.Y. ST. B. J. 392 (1963) (explaining New 
York’s rule of contributory negligence); Charles F. Krause, Comparative Negligence in New 
York, 47 N.Y. ST. B. J. 638 (1975) (discussing the state’s adoption of comparative negligence 
in 1975).   
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interaction with people with cognitive disabilities.  It might be more 
progressive to assign liability on the grounds that doctors believed the 
plaintiff understood the risks and still acted carelessly. 
Another example of both our tendency to underestimate people 
with cognitive disabilities and the uncertainty of the scientific 
understandings of various conditions comes not from caselaw, but from 
the Autism Rights Movement.134  Traditional understandings of 
“classical” autism would suggest that people with autism could not 
possibly be self-advocates and actively participate in a civil rights 
movement,135 but the growing number of “severely” autistic people who 
have achieved literacy casts doubt on that view.136 
The self-advocacy movement originated decades ago when people 
with “mental retardation” formed “People First,”137 an organization that 
now has hundreds of chapters across the country.138  The movement 
developed because the professionals who historically made decisions for 
people with cognitive disabilities underestimated them and insulated 
them too much from society.139  “Underpinning the self-advocacy 
movement is a faith that people with retardation—even the most 
severely retarded person—can be taught to make good choices.”140  The 
scope and momentum of the self-advocacy movement highlights how 
pervasively society tends to underestimate the abilities of people with 
cognitive disabilities and their “willing[ness] to take risks—like anyone 
else—to live like other adults around them.”141 
Given this general tendency to underestimate potential, it seems 
likely that whenever a person with a cognitive disability acted in a way 
 
134. See supra notes 108–10 and accompanying text.   
135. See, e.g., OLIVER SACKS, AN ANTHROPOLOGIST ON MARS 246 (1995) (“Autistic 
people . . . have no true concept of, or feeling for, other minds, or even their own; they have, 
in the jargon of cognitive psychology, no ‘theory of mind.’”).  
136. See, e.g., SAVARESE, supra note 90, at xi–xxxi (discussing examples of literate 
people with classical autism).  An additional example is that the author’s son, who has autism, 
wrote, the final chapter of this book.  See id. at 432–42.  
137. See SHAPIRO, supra note 84, at 184–92 (discussing the origins and growth of the 
self-advocacy movement).  The term “mental retardation” has fallen out of favor and is 
increasingly being replaced by “intellectual disability,” even in the United States Code.  See 
Rosa’s Law, Pub. L. No. 111-256, 124 Stat. 2643 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1400 
(Supp. IV 2011)).   
138. See SHAPIRO, supra note 84, at 186. 
139. Id.  
140. Id. at 187. 
141. Id. at 192.  
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that looked abnormal or sub-standard, judges would assume that it was 
the best that person could do, and that it was therefore reasonable, 
given their disability.142  This presumption of incompetence would carry 
damaging messages about the capabilities of people with cognitive 
disabilities, hardening societal opinions that are already tightly held. 
B. Labeling and Stereotype Threat 
Even if we could confidently assume that courts would accurately 
assess the capabilities of people with cognitive disabilities, rather than 
systematically underestimate them, there are reasons to resist giving 
courts the freedom to label a person as incapable of conforming to the 
reasonable person standard.  A substantial (and sometimes 
controversial) psychological, criminological, and sociological literature 
on “labeling theory” suggests that there is a potential for harm when 
official sources like courts and lawmakers attach labels to groups of 
people.143  Strong proponents of labeling theory argued “that behavior of 
any sort was not intrinsically deviant, but only became deviant when it 
was so designated by powerful social forces”144 and that “some of the 
characteristics used to support the label were either figments of the 
imagination of those assigning it or responses of the labeled person to its 
effects.”145  Taken to its extreme, it is no surprise that labeling theory has 
been highly criticized.  It essentially claims that mental illness does not 
exist—that it is a “socially derived myth.”146 
 
142. This type of underestimation would inappropriately skew how likely judges would 
be to grant summary judgment, how likely they would be to instruct juries to apply the 
relaxed standard, and how likely juries would be to find for the defendant based on the 
relaxed standard. 
143. See Bruce G. Link et al., The Effectiveness of Stigma Coping Orientations: Can 
Negative Consequences of Mental Illness Labeling be Avoided?, 32 J. HEALTH & SOC. 
BEHAV. 302 (1991). 
144. PAUL S. APPELBAUM, ALMOST A REVOLUTION: MENTAL HEALTH LAW AND THE 
LIMITS OF CHANGE 5 (1994). 
145. MINOW, supra note 49, at 175. 
146. See APPELBAUM, supra note 144, at 7; see also MINOW, supra note 49, at 174–77 
(recounting the development of, and controversy surrounding, labeling theory).  Thomas 
Szasz is a central figure among the labeling theorists and he, unlike others who once shared 
his views, “is entirely unrepentant” about having “denied the existence of mental illness.”  
APPELBAUM, supra note 144, at 7.  Despite the flaws in Szasz’s theory, an article that he co-
authored that discusses applying an objective standard to people with cognitive disabilities is 
highly relevant to this Article.  See Alexander & Szasz, supra note 2.  It is worth 
distinguishing between the erroneous view that cognitive disability is a “socially derived 
myth” and the pursuit of a “social model” of disability that is central to the disability rights 
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However, a tempered version of labeling theory has greater value.  
More moderate advocates “did not assert that mental disability is itself 
fictional.  Instead, they targeted the consequences of the label’s 
application: that is, the social meanings of mental disabilities rather than 
the fact of mental disability.”147  Along these lines, Bruce Link pioneered 
a “modified labeling theory” that “does not assign to labeling the power 
to create mental illness directly.  Instead, [it] view[s] labeling and stigma 
as possible causes of negative outcomes.”148  Link maintains that a label’s 
stigma can negatively affect a person by exposing them to stereotypes 
and cultural rejection, but he also acknowledges that labeling is crucial 
because it allows for beneficial treatment.149  When a person with a 
cognitive disability seeks treatment, “they can benefit from the positive 
effects of treatment, [but] they are also exposed to the negative effects 
of stigma.”150 
Link focused specifically on mental illness (such as schizophrenia 
and psychosis),151 as opposed to cognitive disability broadly, but his 
insight about labels can be applied across disabilities and, more 
importantly, across groups of people with different attitudes toward 
their disabilities.  Link’s work assumes the desire for “treatment,”152 an 
attitude that is not universal to people with cognitive disabilities.153  Yet, 
in the same way that a person seeking treatment must accept the official 
label that comes with it, a person seeking appropriate adaptive and 
assistive technology must accept being labeled in order to take 
advantage of the most up-to-date technologies and techniques for 
helping a person with their particular disability.154 
 
movement.  Proponents of the social model of disability do not deny the existence of 
differences between disabled and non-disabled people; however, they shift the focus away 
from the inherent traits of the person with a disability toward the interaction between those 
traits and aspects of the physical and social world that make the disability more limiting than 
it otherwise would be.  See supra Part IV.B.1.  
147. MINOW, supra note 49, at 175.  
148. Bruce G. Link et al., A Modified Labeling Theory Approach to Mental Disorders, 
54 AM. SOC. REV. 400, 404 (1989) (emphasis added). 
149. See Bruce G. Link & Jo C. Phelan, Labeling and Stigma, in HANDBOOK OF THE 
SOCIOLOGY OF MENTAL HEALTH 481, 486 (Carol S. Aneshensel & Jo C. Phelan eds., 1999). 
150. Id. at 491.  For a classic discussion of stigma, see ERVING GOFFMAN, STIGMA: 
NOTES ON THE MANAGEMENT OF SPOILED IDENTITY (1963).  
151. See Link & Phelan, supra note 149, at 481.  
152. Id. at 486.  
153. See supra notes 105–10 and accompanying text.  
154. See Link & Phelan, supra note 149, at 491–92. 
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Modified labeling theory sheds important light on the expressive 
harms that would accompany a relaxed standard.  Psychiatrists, 
caretakers, and family members must be in the business of assigning 
labels in order to serve the needs of people with cognitive disabilities, 
whether their goal is treatment or acceptance, integration, and 
independence.  The same cannot be said of the tort system.  The 
recipient of the official label would be subjected to the stigma associated 
with the label, without receiving the potential benefits of the label that 
Link envisioned. 
A related theory, which also highlights the importance of expressive 
effects, is Claude Steele and Joshua Aronson’s theory of “stereotype 
threat.”155  They claim that members of stereotyped or stigmatized 
groups “face the threat of confirming . . . a negative societal 
stereotype . . . about their group’s . . . ability and competence.”156  In 
other words, stereotypes can become self-fulfilling prophecies.157  The 
stronger a stereotype is and the more salient it becomes to a stereotyped 
group, the more likely it is that the group’s behavior will confirm the 
stereotype.158 
When people are made to believe they are less intellectually capable 
by virtue of belonging to a certain race or gender, they are at risk of 
confirming the stereotype by performing intellectual tasks poorly.159  
Other groups are vulnerable to stereotype threat as well.  For example, 
a study found that people who had suffered head injuries performed 
worse on intellectual tests if they were made to believe that they were 
expected to perform badly due to their injuries.160  Given these findings, 
it is likely that people with cognitive disabilities are also vulnerable to 
stereotype threat, and it is conceivable that if the legal system fosters a 
belief that people with cognitive disabilities are dangerous and 
incompetent, stereotype threat will increase the likelihood that their 
 
155. See Claude M. Steele & Joshua Aronson, Stereotype Threat and the Intellectual Test 
Performance of African Americans, 69 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 797 (1995). 
156. Id. at 797. 
157. Id. 
158. For a summary of the stereotype threat literature, which demonstrates the breadth 
of the research and the consistency of the findings, see Loriann Roberson & Carol T. Kulik, 
Stereotype Threat at Work, 21 ACAD. MGMT. PERSP. 24, 28–29 (2007).   
159. See, e.g., Steele & Aronson, supra note 155. 
160. See Julie A. Suhr & John Gunstad, “Diagnosis Threat”: The Effect of Negative 
Expectations on Cognitive Performance in Head Injury, 24 J. CLINICAL & EXPERIMENTAL 
NEUROPSYCHOLOGY 448 (2002). 
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behavior will match these preconceived notions. 
Under a relaxed standard, labels of incompetence and 
dangerousness would be written on the face of the law.  Whenever a 
judge applied the relaxed standard, a label would be attached and a 
stereotype would be strengthened.  The label would say, simply, that the 
person is incompetent and incapable of reasonable behavior.  Modified 
labeling theory and stereotype threat theory demonstrate the potential 
negative repercussions of this official message. 
C. Other Concerns 
There are at least two other problems the relaxed standard could 
cause.  First, it would force parties to either maintain their potential for 
competence and face liability or label themselves as incompetent and 
avoid liability.  Imagine a person with autism or Down syndrome who is 
working with family members and caretakers to develop literacy skills, 
vocational skills, and independence.  If this person became involved in a 
tort suit and had access to a relaxed standard, it would be in the family’s 
financial interest to present lay and expert testimony on the scope of the 
person’s incompetence.  Litigation is already a psychologically taxing, 
even traumatic, ordeal, and if the people closest to a party argue that he 
or she is incompetent and present endless evidence about the severe 
limitations of his or her disability, it could have damaging effects.161  
Additionally, because the relaxed standard would only protect 
“particular identity groups,” it would “effectively force group members 
to conform with the identity script that is dominant within their group at 
the pain of being denied protection.”162  For example, a person with 
autism would need to conform to the widely held belief that he or she is 
incapable of certain levels of understanding and self-control in order to 
avoid liability. 
While there is undoubtedly something paternalistic about arguing 
that people with disabilities and their families should not be allowed to 
make the choice to pursue a relaxed standard, the temptation to avoid 
 
161. Taking this thought experiment one step further, one can imagine that it might be 
empowering for a party to hear the opposition build a case of their competence and 
capabilities, but nonetheless, the messages sent by the person’s own lawyer and family would 
probably be particularly powerful.  
162. BAGENSTOS, supra note 72, at 51.  Along these same lines, scholars have argued 
that civil rights statutes like the ADA encourage litigation strategies that contribute to 
stereotypes rather than chip away at them.  See Laura L. Rovner, Perpetuating Stigma: Client 
Identity in Disability Rights Litigation, 2001 UTAH L. REV. 247, 250.  
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liability could be powerful enough and the ordeal of presenting one’s 
self as incompetent damaging enough that the choice between avoiding 
liability and potential competence should not be on the table.163 
A recent case is illustrative.  In a battery case, the court modified the 
common law rule of applying the objective standard to people with 
cognitive disabilities and allowed the defendant to present the defense 
that he was incapable of forming the requisite intent to commit a 
tortious battery.164  The defendant “suffered from autism and ‘mild to 
moderate mental retardation.’”165  Because the court allowed a defense 
based on inability to form intent (which is effectively analogous to a 
court applying a relaxed standard in a negligence case), it was 
advantageous for the defendant to argue that he was incompetent.  
Thus, the defendant submitted “extensive medical records documenting 
his diminished mental capabilities and contend[ed] that they indicate 
that he had the mental capacity of a child that is six years and six months 
old.”166  On the other hand, the plaintiff presented evidence that the 
defendant almost certainly would have embraced, but for its legal 
significance in his case.167  This included a report from a psychologist the 
defendant had seen prior to becoming involved in the suit stating that 
“[t]he overwhelming feeling regarding [the defendant] is that he will 
continue his positive behavior, and demonstrate more independence 
and self reliance” and that he was “displaying increasing maturity.”168  
The fact that the defendant allegedly committed a battery suggests he 
had behavioral problems to address, but the plaintiff’s evidence showed 
he had been improving. 169  The availability of a relaxed standard forced 
the defendant and his family to argue that the improvements were 
meaningless.170  Given the fragility of our conceptions of our own 
 
163. Along these same lines, Alexander and Szasz raised concerns about a defense of 
mental illness being imposed on the party by guardians who are “vitally interested in 
preserving the insane person’s assets.”  See Alexander & Szasz, supra note 2, at 36–37.  That 
being said, the presence of liability insurance, discussed infra notes 255–258 and 
accompanying text, may mitigate this risk. 
164. See Braley v. Midland Cnty. Educ. Servs. Agency, No. 06-11990-BC, 2007 WL 
3332859, at *8 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 8, 2007).  
165. Id. at *2. 
166. Id. at *7. 
167. Id. at *8. 
168. Id.  
169. Id. at *3, *8. 
170. Id. at *7. 
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competence,171 one can imagine that the defendant suffered as a result of 
the litigation strategies he had to pursue in an attempt to avoid 
liability.172  
A final concern with a relaxed standard is that a defendant who 
avoids liability might be involuntarily committed, as in the criminal 
system after a successful insanity defense.  One commentator who 
argues for a relaxed standard suggests that this result would be 
appropriate.173  Because Harlow focuses primarily on people with 
psychotic disorders,174 she does not consider that the same rule would 
likely be applied to everyone under the broad label of cognitive 
disability.  The fact that courts might order involuntary commitment 
adds another layer to the difficult decision parties would face.  For 
some, the threat of involuntary commitment would make the option of 
arguing for competence and accepting liability more appealing, but 
others still might end up facing involuntary commitment if the prospect 
of liability was too daunting.  Involuntary commitment is certainly 
appropriate in a narrow subset of cases, but it would not be an 
appropriate remedy for every defendant who would avoid liability as a 
result of their cognitive disability under a relaxed standard. 
VI. EXPRESSIVE CONSEQUENCES OF THE OBJECTIVE STANDARD 
In Part III, I argued that the current rule is fairer than a relaxed 
standard and is also consistent with tort law’s wider preference for 
ignoring individuals’ cognitive capabilities.  In Part V, I argued that a 
relaxed standard would come with troubling expressive consequences as 
well.  I now examine whether the expressive effects of the current rule—
as it is currently justified and applied—are preferable.  Then I consider 
how tort law could maximize the current rule’s potential for expressive 
benefit by discussing and justifying the rule differently. 
 
171. See, e.g., Joshua Aronson & Claude M. Steele, Stereotypes and the Fragility of 
Academic Competence, Motivation, and Self-Concept, in HANDBOOK OF COMPETENCE AND 
MOTIVATION 436, 436 (Andrew J. Elliot & Carol S. Dweck eds., 2005) (“[C]ompetence is 
much more fragile—and malleable—than we tend to think.”).  
172. Interestingly though, the court in this case denied summary judgment, leaving open 
the possibility that the defendant was more competent than he argued.  Braley, 2007 WL 
3332859, at *8.  Given courts’ tendency to underestimate the ability of people with cognitive 
disabilities, this is a somewhat surprising result.  
173. Harlow, supra note 2, at 1759–60 (“[T]he logical outcome of finding a defendant not 
liable based solely on his mental illness is inpatient treatment.  As in criminal cases, the 
defendant would be discharged at the suggestion of the treating psychiatrist.”).  
174. Id. at 1737. 
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A. Expressive Harms of the Current Rationales 
One could argue that holding people with cognitive disabilities to the 
reasonable person standard sends a message that they are competent, 
that they are complete citizens, and that they deserve equal treatment.  
However, the simple application of a law—the fact of its existence—can 
express a wide range of messages depending on why the law exists and 
the rhetoric with which it is discussed in court. 175  While some might 
receive a message of competence and equality from the current rule, 
others might receive the message that people with cognitive disabilities 
are dangerous and must be made to compensate those that they will 
inevitably injure.  Therefore, we must examine the reasons for the law 
that are presented to the public by the Restatement and by judges in 
order to figure out which message is being sent. 
Commentators have supported the current rule with a variety of 
arguments.  Stephanie Splane focuses on a goal of “community 
treatment” and argues the rule “helps foster community acceptance of 
the mentally ill, and encourages the mentally ill to become self-
sufficient, responsible members of the community.”176  George 
Alexander and Thomas Szasz argue that applying the objective 
reasonable person standard to people with cognitive disabilities avoids 
“creat[ing] a class of irresponsible persons,” “shut off from society and 
desocialized,” “dehumanized and friendless.”177  Both Splane and 
Alexander & Szasz argue that applying the objective standard will aid 
inclusion and integration.178  They argue that individuals will be more 
likely to engage with people with cognitive disabilities if they know they 
might be compensated if harm occurs.179  Daniel Shuman makes a 
different argument.  He focuses on therapeutic jurisprudence and 
proposes a way in which the objective standard could “encourage[] a 
therapeutic result by stating to the mentally ill and walking wounded 
that they cannot rely on their mental or emotional problems to avoid 
responsibility for their behavior or failure to initiate treatment.”180 
Missing from these discussions of the rule’s benefits is analysis of the 
rhetoric courts and the Restatement use in applying it.  Splane, 
 
175. See supra Part IV.A. 
176. Splane, supra note 2, at 163–64. 
177. Alexander & Szasz, supra note 2, at 36.  
178. See Alexander & Szasz, supra note 2, at 36; Splane, supra note 2, at 164–65. 
179. See Alexander & Szasz, supra note 2, at 36; Splane, supra note 2, at 165.  
180. Shuman, supra note 2, at 419. 
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Alexander & Szasz, and Shuman may overstate the rule’s upside 
because of this oversight.  There is potential for expressive benefit in 
applying the objective standard, which I will discuss below,181 but the 
Restatements and the courts do not tend to discuss the rule in a manner 
likely to capitalize on this potential. 
As noted above, the most recent Restatement presents three primary 
justifications for applying the reasonable person standard to people with 
cognitive disabilities: (1) determining the causal connection between a 
cognitive disability and substandard conduct presents administrative 
concerns (presumably the Reporters envision difficult line-drawing 
problems); (2) because “modern society” is “in favor of 
deinstitutionalization, there is nothing especially harsh in at least 
holding [people with cognitive disabilities] responsible for [the] harms 
that [their] clearly substandard conduct causes”; and (3) “it frequently 
will be the case that the law cannot expect [a person with cognitive 
disabilities] wisely and appropriately to moderate conduct choices so as 
to take the person’s disability into account.”182  The justification that 
courts seem to rely on most heavily is the second, which posits that it is 
fair for people with cognitive disabilities to pay for the harm they 
cause.183  
The Restatement and judges seem to accept that there is a societal 
preference for deinstitutionalization and believe this will inevitably lead 
to harms at the hands of people with cognitive disabilities.184  Requiring 
people with cognitive disabilities to pay for harm they cause is both fair 
and doctrinally coherent;185 however, in asserting this justification, courts 
tend to project the message that people with cognitive disabilities are 
 
181. See infra Part VI.B. 
182. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND 
EMOTIONAL HARM § 11 cmt. e (2010).  The third justification is an attempt to explain why 
courts allow a relaxed standard for people with physical disabilities, but not people with 
cognitive disabilities.  The comment compares people with cognitive disabilities to people 
with physical disabilities and asserts that people with physical disabilities can be “expected to 
adopt extra precautions to respond to the extra level of risk that [they] create[].”  Id.  
183. See, e.g., Mochen v. State, 352 N.Y.S.2d 290, 292 (App. Div. 1974) (“The injury to 
the plaintiff is quite as real whether precipitated by a careless or clumsy defendant or by one 
who suffers some mental deficiency.  Under any circumstances, the negligently injured 
plaintiff’s right to be compensated does not depend upon the operation of the individual 
defendant’s mind.”). 
184. See, e.g., Creasy v. Rusk, 730 N.E.2d 659, 664–66 (Ind. 2000) (citing legislative 
developments in Indiana and nationally that show the trend toward deinstitutionalization and 
supporting the policy justifications presented in the Restatement).  
185. See supra Part III; see also infra Parts VII.B, VII.C.   
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dangerous and only the promise of compensation makes 
deinstitutionalization defensible.  The incompetence of people with 
cognitive disabilities is presented as an incontestable truth that the law 
and the rest of society must work around.  A state court of appeals 
summed up the judicial stance in 1991: “[I]t is impossible to 
ascribe . . . the departure from the standard of a ‘reasonable’ 
person . . . to one who, like [the defendant], is by definition unable to 
control his own actions through any exercise of reason. . . .  Instead, the 
conclusion that liability exists is founded . . . upon principles of good 
public policy . . . .”186 
By heavily emphasizing that deinstitutionalization is only acceptable 
if people with cognitive disabilities are held liable for harms they cause, 
courts frame those harms as categorically different than harms caused 
by people without disabilities.  When a nondisabled person causes an 
accidental harm, it is typically seen as blameworthy and deterrable, but 
when a person with a cognitive disability causes harm, the knee-jerk 
reaction is that the harm was inevitable, that deterrence is not a relevant 
consideration, and that the actor should be held liable but is not 
blameworthy due to his incompetence. 
This type of rhetoric, which suggests that there is no hope for 
reasonable behavior and that only fairness to the injured party justifies 
the current rule, will lead people to believe that harm will inevitably 
follow if they interact with individuals with cognitive disabilities.  This is 
not a message that will encourage inclusion and integration.  The 
promise of compensation ex post is not likely to persuade people to 
interact with a person they believe will inevitably harm them or their 
property.187  The messages embedded in the current rule do nothing to 
improve societal perceptions of people with cognitive disabilities.  In 
fact, they perpetuate stereotypes of complete incompetence and may 
increase the stigmatization and rejection of people with cognitive 
disabilities. 
One of the most powerful sources of stigma and rejection faced by 
people with cognitive disabilities is a public perception that they are 
dangerous.  According to some researchers, “[t]he association between 
mental illness and violence in public consciousness is pervasive,” and it 
“is the most damaging stereotype faced by the mental health 
 
186. Anicet v. Gant, 580 So. 2d 273, 275 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (emphasis added) 
(citations omitted).  
187. See supra notes 116–17 and accompanying text.  
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community.”188  These perceptions have “existed for centuries” and 
“[t]he fear is nourished by public media portrayals of criminals as insane 
and the highlighting of cases of violence among individuals with 
psychiatric histories.”189  These widespread, exaggerated190 perceptions 
“can have a devastating effect on a person’s prospects for relationships, 
employment, housing, and social functioning.”191  The classic source of 
this fear may be an erratic violent outburst committed by a person with 
some form of psychosis, but the public’s fear extends to people with all 
sorts of cognitive disabilities who are viewed as incompetent.192 
Given that public perceptions of dangerousness are a particularly 
salient source of stigma, the courts should tread with special care when 
they send messages about a person’s competence and potential for 
reasonable behavior.  Stereotypes and public perceptions of people with 
disabilities are at least partially to blame for the inability of people with 
disabilities to integrate into communities and find employment.193  The 
 
188. John Monahan & Jean Arnold, Violence by People with Mental Illness: A 
Consensus Statement by Advocates and Researchers, 19 PSYCHIATRIC REHABILITATION J. 67, 
67 (1996).  
189. Caroline L. Kaufmann, Reasonable Accommodation to Mental Health Disabilities at 
Work: Legal Constructs and Practical Applications, 21 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 153, 168 (1993) 
(footnotes omitted).  
190. Some studies have found that “[u]nless drugs or alcohol are involved, people with 
mental disorders do not pose any more threat to the community than anyone else.”  See John 
M. Grohol, Dispelling the Myth of Violence and Mental Illness, PSYCH CENTRAL (June 1998), 
http://psychcentral.com/archives/violence.htm.  Others have found that people with serious 
mental illness, such as schizophrenia or bipolar disorder, are slightly more likely to commit a 
violent act, but that this should not distract from “the larger perspective—that most people 
who are violent are not mentally ill, and most people who are mentally ill are not violent.”  
See Richard A. Friedman, Violence and Mental Illness—How Strong is the Link?, 355 NEW. 
ENG. J. MED. 2064, 2065–66 (2006); see also Violence and Mental Illness: The Facts, 
RESOURCE CENTER TO PROMOTE ACCEPTANCE, DIGNITY & SOC. INCLUSION, http://prom
oteacceptance.samhsa.gov/publications/facts.aspx (last updated June 22, 2012) [hereinafter 
Violence and Mental Illness—How Strong  is the Link?] (surveying studies on the link 
between violence and mental illness and finding that “[m]ost citizens believe persons with 
mental illnesses are dangerous” and that, “in truth, people have little reason for such fears”).   
191. Friedman, supra note 190, at 2064; cf. Palmer v. Circuit Court, 117 F.3d 351, 352 
(7th Cir. 1997) (“The [ADA] does not require an employer to retain a potentially violent 
employee.”).   
192. See Martha Nussbaum, The Capabilities of People with Cognitive Disabilities, in 
COGNITIVE DISABILITY AND ITS CHALLENGE TO MORAL PHILOSOPHY 75, 81 (Eva Feder 
Kittay & Licia Carlson eds., 2010) (“[M]any if not most social preferences in this area are 
deformed by ignorance, stigma, and fear.”).  
193. Not only are people with disabilities more likely to be unemployed than the 
nondisabled, they are also less likely to eat at restaurants, socialize with friends, and 
participate in other community activities.  See BAGENSTOS, supra note 72, at 116–17. 
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courts have some power to either exacerbate or alleviate these harms.  
When courts portray harms as inevitable and undeterrable, they feed an 
already overblown misconception that all people with cognitive 
disabilities are dangerous.194 
Additionally, the insights of modified labeling theory and stereotype 
threat theory shed important light on the expressive harms that are 
embedded in the current rule’s justifications.195  The justifications 
presented in the third Restatement portray people with cognitive 
disabilities as incompetent, thereby reinforcing the stigma and 
stereotypes associated with the label.196  Crucially though, none of the 
positive aspects of labeling occur.  Whether a person undergoes 
treatment or seeks therapy and technology that will lead to integration 
is a decision that does not hinge on a judge’s pronouncements and 
rhetoric in a tort suit. 197   
There are legitimate doctrinal and policy considerations that support 
the current rule,198 but these goals would be served equally well whether 
the rule’s justifications labeled people with cognitive disabilities as 
incompetent or managed to refrain from sending such messages.  For 
these reasons, the Restatement and judges should develop a heightened 
awareness of the labels they attach to the parties before them and avoid 
rhetoric that contains damaging messages when there are sensible 
alternative justifications for their decisions.199 
Finally, the rule’s few supporters seem to assume that people with 
cognitive disabilities who become parties in tort suits will be similar 
enough that what is good for one will be good for all.  For example, 
Daniel Shuman proposes offering a relaxed standard to people with 
cognitive disabilities who have taken efforts to treat their condition 
 
194. See Violence and Mental Illness—How Strong is the Link?, supra note 190. 
195. See supra Part V.B. 
196. For example, the comment argues that allowing a relaxed standard for people with 
cognitive disabilities “would be one-sided in a way that recognizing physical disability is not” 
because “it frequently will be the case that the law cannot expect the person wisely and 
appropriately to moderate conduct choices.”  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 11 cmt. e.  
The insertion of the word “frequently” does not do much to soften the message, which is that 
people with cognitive disabilities are necessarily incapable of recognizing their limitations or 
difficulties and incapable of exercising rational thought.  
197. By inadvertently reinforcing stereotypes, the Restatement and courts expose people 
with cognitive disabilities to the risks of stereotype threat as well. 
198. See supra Part III. 
199. See infra Part VI.B.  
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prior to the lawsuit.200  If the tort system incentivizes people to “treat” 
their cognitive disabilities, it buys into the damaging medical model of 
disability.  The message embedded in this proposed law would be that 
all should seek to eliminate their disabilities and take all steps to 
become “normal.”  This might be appropriate for individuals who 
conceive of their disability as a disease, but groups like “The Autism 
Self-Advocate Network” or “Autism International Network” would 
probably not find it benign.201 
The literature primarily focuses on “mental illness,” “insanity,” or 
“psychosis.”202  This is perhaps because most of the cases applying the 
objective standard to people with cognitive disabilities have involved 
actors with schizophrenia or some other form of psychosis.203  However, 
it overlooks the heterogeneity of cognitive disability.  The number of 
Americans with cognitive disabilities is staggering204 and the number of 
tort suits involving people with a variety of cognitive disabilities is 
bound to increase as the movement toward integration and 
independence continues to grow.205  Courts will have to decide if the 
policy justifications expressed in the third Restatement, which developed 
in response to cases involving actors with psychoses, can be applied to 
people with substantially different cognitive disabilities who may 
 
200. See Shuman, supra note 2, at 426. 
201. See supra notes 108–10 and accompanying text. 
202. See, e.g., Harlow, supra note 2, at 1737 (focusing on actors who are unable to 
“distinguish between fact and thoughts and sensations caused by the actor’s illness”); Jacobi, 
supra note 2, at 115 (proposing a “‘reasonably prudent insane person’ standard”). 
203. See, e.g., Delahanty v. Hinckley, 799 F. Supp. 184, 185 (D.D.C. 1992); Ramey v. 
Knorr, 124 P.3d 314, 320 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005); Jankee v. Clark Cnty., 2000 WI 64, ¶ 11, 235 
Wis. 2d 700, 612 N.W.2d 297.  But see Burch v. Am. Fam. Mut. Ins. Co., 198 Wis. 2d 465, 469, 
543 N.W.2d 277, 278 (1996) (“[Defendant] was born with cerebral palsy and mental 
retardation with autistic tendencies . . . .”).   
204. For example, by some counts, there are over one million people in America with an 
autism spectrum disorder, Facts and Statistics, AUTISM SOCIETY, http://www.autism-
society.org/about-autism/facts-and-statistics.html (last visited Oct. 17, 2012), and hundreds of 
thousands of people with Down syndrome, Nat’l Down Syndrome Soc’y, Down Syndrome 
Facts, NDSS.ORG, http://www.ndss.org/Down-Syndrome/Down-Syndrome-Facts/ (last visited 
Oct. 17, 2012). 
205. Not because people with cognitive disabilities are necessarily more likely to cause 
accidental harm, but simply based on the law of averages.  As the disability rights movement 
grows over time, more people with cognitive disabilities will find ways to live independently, 
enter the workforce, and attend college.  For a story about a non-speaking person with autism 
preparing to attend a selective liberal arts college and live in the dormitories, see Ralph 
James Savarese, The Silver Trumpet of Freedom, HUFFINGTON POST, Feb. 23, 2011, http://ww
w.huffingtonpost.com/ralph-james-savarese/the-silver-trumpet-of-fre_b_827107.html. 
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conceive of their disability in an entirely different light than prior 
parties.  Commentators, judges, and the Restatement’s Reporters tend 
not to sufficiently acknowledge the substantial heterogeneity of people 
with cognitive disabilities (and the heterogeneity of their attitudes 
toward their disabilities).  Most importantly, they too frequently 
presume incompetence and treat harms caused by people with cognitive 
disabilities as undeterrable, which exacerbates stereotypes and fear, to 
the detriment of inclusion and integration efforts.  
B. Sending a More Progressive Message 
The practical effects of the objective standard may not directly 
motivate better treatment of people with cognitive disabilities,206 but the 
potentially positive expressive effects could do so over time.  Judges and 
the Restatement’s Reporters have the power to carefully control the 
social meaning that is embedded in the rules of tort law.  The current 
rule could express very different messages depending on how it is 
discussed, justified, and implemented.  This Part considers how the tort 
system could send more progressive, beneficial messages without 
abandoning the results it favors. 
The primary change I advocate is for courts to avoid unnecessarily 
announcing that a person is incompetent.  Courts should also adopt and 
express a presumption of competence in appropriate cases when there is 
uncertainty about the abilities of an actor with a cognitive disability. 
The nature of the objective standard is that liability attaches 
regardless of whether a person who acted negligently was, in fact, 
capable of exercising greater care.207  Once a court or jury finds that a 
person’s conduct fell short of the reasonable person standard, there is no 
need to take another step and announce the belief that the person was 
incapable of exercising adequate care.208  The ideal response would be 
for a court to explain that it is unnecessary to inquire into whether the 
person was actually capable of greater caution.  Courts could even 
acknowledge our uncertainty about the potential competence of many 
people with cognitive disabilities and explain that the objective standard 
effectively presumes the competence of the person before the court. 
 
206. See supra notes 116–17 and accompanying text. 
207. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283B cmt. c (1965); RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 11 cmt. e (2010).  
208. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283B cmt. c; RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF TORTS § 11 cmt. e. 
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Additionally, and closely related, courts should not assume that 
harms caused by people with cognitive disabilities are categorically 
different than harms caused by nondisabled people.  That is, courts 
should strive to avoid presenting harm as inevitable and undeterrable.  
Those messages run the risk of perpetuating stereotypes about the 
dangerousness of people with cognitive disabilities and enhancing 
stigma and rejection.  By adopting a universalist approach (that is, 
eschewing labels and conceiving of accidental harms caused by all 
people similarly), courts could send a more progressive message. 
In practice, this would be a somewhat subtle change, but subtle 
changes in the messages sent by official actors can alter societal opinions 
in meaningful ways.  By avoiding unnecessarily attaching a label of 
incompetence, acknowledging our uncertainty about the capabilities of 
many people with cognitive disabilities, and expressing a presumption of 
competence in appropriate cases, courts will increase the likelihood that 
the public will do the same.  This will reduce the public’s discomfort 
with people with cognitive disabilities, motivate the public to be more 
accepting, and work to the benefit of inclusion and integration efforts. 
One of the few cases involving a party with an intellectual cognitive 
disability opposed to psychosis demonstrates the problematic messages 
sent when a court does not follow the practices suggested above.  In 
Burch v. American Family Mutual Insurance, a state supreme court 
adhered to the traditional rule and applied the reasonable person 
standard to a fifteen year-old girl (Amy)209 who was “severely 
developmentally disabled.”210  The court did not discuss the justifications 
for the rule in detail, but it did discuss Amy’s capabilities.211  Despite its 
 
209. Burch v. Am. Fam. Mut. Ins. Co., 198 Wis. 2d 465, 473–74, 543 N.W.2d 277, 280 
(1996).  The court did not apply a relaxed standard based on Amy’s age because operating a 
vehicle was held to be an adult activity by the court below.  Id. at 473–74 n.5, 543 N.W.2d at 
280 n.5. 
210. Id. at 468, 543 N.W.2d at 278. 
211. Id. at 474–75, 543 N.W.2d at 281 (“Amy . . . was not capable of performing 
household chores such as sweeping or making her bed.  She did not testify at the trial because 
. . . her mother indicated that Amy would not be able to understand the oath . . . [and] would 
have no comprehension of the court, jury or trial process.”).  In this case, the court could not 
follow this article’s primary suggestion of simply not discussing the person’s subjective 
capabilities because Amy’s competence was relevant to whether her father was negligent in 
his supervision of her.  See id. at 473 n.4, 543 N.W.2d at 281.  The court was effectively 
applying a somewhat well-established rule that the mental capabilities of an actor are 
considered when the question is whether another person was negligent for “encouraging or 
provoking” them.  See Mark F. Grady, The Free Radicals of Tort, 11 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 
189, 189 (2003).   
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somewhat limited understanding of Amy’s abilities, the court 
determined as a matter of law that her father’s contributory negligence 
in leaving her alone in a parked truck exceeded her negligence for 
allegedly reaching over and turning the key.212  The Court expressed no 
reservations about the conclusion of the jury below, holding that the 
verdict should “clearly” be affirmed.213  The court’s conclusion sends 
damaging messages about people with cognitive disabilities. 
Amy’s father testified that Amy had been instructed not to touch the 
truck’s controls and she had not done so in the past.214  He seemingly 
believed she was capable of following instructions and controlling her 
behavior, yet the court held that it was more negligent for Amy’s father 
to leave her unattended in the passenger seat for a brief moment then it 
was for her to turn the keys in the ignition from the passenger seat, 
which she had been told not to do.215  The court seemed to presume 
Amy’s complete incompetence and sent a message that people with 
cognitive disabilities must be attended to at all times for their safety and 
the safety of others. 
Applying the reasonable person standard to people with cognitive 
disabilities gives courts a valuable opportunity to send a message of 
potential competence.  Whether the disability rights movement succeeds 
in achieving greater integration and inclusion for people with cognitive 
disabilities hinges largely on societal perceptions of people with 
cognitive disabilities.  Societal perceptions are malleable, and the courts 
have a role to play in reducing people’s discomfort and fear, rather than 
reinforcing it.  Once the reasonable person standard is applied, the 
concrete consequences are fixed, but the expressive consequences could 
be altered if courts justified the rule based on uncertainty about the 
capabilities of actors with cognitive disabilities.  Instead, courts typically 
recite the explanations presented in the Restatement and unnecessarily 
presume incompetence.216 
My argument that courts should avoid unnecessarily opining on 
people’s subjective capabilities and embrace a presumption of potential 
competence in their opinions does not deny that people with cognitive 
disabilities encounter limitations and sometimes find it difficult, or 
 
212. Burch, 198 Wis. 2d at 476, 543 N.W.2d at 281. 
213. Id. at 476, 543 N.W.2d at 282.  
214. Id. at 475, 543 N.W.2d at 281.  
215. Id. at 476, 543 N.W.2d at 281. 
216. See, e.g., Anicet v. Grant, 580 So. 2d  273, 275 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991). 
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impossible, to behave “normally.”  It is probably true that courts 
sometimes encounter parties who, due to particularly severe limitations, 
unquestionably could not have acted differently.  For this reason, courts 
need not alter their rhetoric in every case involving a person with a 
cognitive disability.  If an actor’s conduct was unambiguously non-
volitional and it is abundantly clear that the actor lacks the potential to 
meet the reasonable person standard, courts can carefully adjust the 
language they use to justify the rule, focusing more on fairness to the 
injured party.  However, given our uncertainty about people’s potential 
and our tendency to underestimate it, courts should still err strongly on 
the side of sending a message of potential competence by simply not 
discussing the person’s actual, subjective capabilities because such 
discussion is not necessary to the resolution of the case. 
The rhetoric I propose may also seem an ill fit for people who 
conceive of their disability as a disease, would welcome an opportunity 
to be “cured,” and do not consider themselves competent.  With respect 
to these individuals, it may be especially paternalistic to argue that 
courts should adopt a presumption of competence and present all 
accidental harms as potentially deterrable rather than acknowledging 
that in some cases, a disability undoubtedly made it impossible for the 
individual to act at all differently.  However, as I will discuss below, laws 
and policies cannot immediately be declared inconsistent with the 
projects of the disability rights movement simply because they have 
paternalistic elements.217 
These subtle changes to judicial rhetoric are necessary because 
courts have been known to underestimate the competence of people 
with cognitive disabilities.218  Further, the harm of sending a message of 
incompetence about a person who may be more capable than the court 
realizes seems likely to outweigh the harm of sending a message of 
competence about a person who truly does not have the potential to do 
any better.  Without abandoning doctrine that leads to the fairest 
results, courts have the ability to leave open the possibility of potential 
competence in the people they judge and not present accidental harms 
caused by people with cognitive disabilities in a categorically different 
light than those caused by nondisabled individuals.  By making these 
subtle changes, courts can potentially chip away at damaging stereotypes 
and stigmas, or at least not perpetuate them. 
 
217. See infra Part VII.A. 
218. See supra notes 122–33 and accompanying text.  
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Judicial opinions and the Restatement are not tort law’s only 
mechanisms for causing expressive harms or benefits.  In many civil 
trials, there is no written opinion, which means the jury instructions may 
be the most powerful official opportunity to send either harmful or 
beneficial messages to the public.219  New York courts provide the 
following jury instruction on the standard of care for people who have 
cognitive disabilities: 
One who is disabled by reason of (mental illness, retardation, 
developmental disability) and who is thus lacking in mental 
capacity and prudence must still observe toward others the same 
care which a normal and reasonably prudent person would use 
under the same circumstances.  If the acts of a (mentally ill, 
mentally retarded, developmentally disabled) person would 
constitute negligence on the part of a normal and reasonably 
prudent person under the same circumstances, then the 
(mentally ill, mentally retarded, developmentally disabled) 
person must be found negligent.220 
Aside from the repeated juxtaposition between “normal” and 
“disabled” people, the instruction is not inherently harmful on an 
expressive level, but no explanation is given for the rule, despite the fact 
that many jurors are likely to find it counterintuitive.  Jurors are likely 
to fall back on stereotypes and misconceptions and assume that the 
person with the cognitive disability is incompetent.  An instruction like 
the following could be more expressively beneficial: 
The standard of care required for people of all mental ability 
levels is that of a reasonably prudent person.  People who may 
be more capable of exercising caution than average are not held 
to a higher standard, and people who may be less capable of 
exercising caution than average, because of disability or any 
other reason, are not held to a lower standard.  The jury should 
not attempt to assess an individual’s actual capability to exercise 
 
219. Beyond judges and the Restatement’s Reporters, legal commentators also have a 
role to play in shaping the expressive effects of legal rules.  For an example of an article that 
is arguably a bit insensitive about rhetoric’s potential to cause expressive harms, see Grady, 
supra note 211, at 191, which coins the label “free radicals” to describe persons with mental 
illness and other groups of “irresponsible people.”  Free radicals are “materials with high 
reactivity and high energy [that] can be collected and stored only with special precautions.”  
Id. at 191 n.5 (quoting ARTHUR ROSE & ELIZABETH ROSE, THE CONDENSED CHEMICAL 
DICTIONARY 514 (6th ed. 1961)). 
220. NEW YORK PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS–CIVIL § 2:21 (West 1997). 
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caution and should not hold an individual to a higher or lower 
standard based on any such assessment. 
This hypothetical instruction highlights that the tort system ignores 
all people’s unique mental capabilities, not just the mental capabilities 
of people with disabilities.  Without being unfairly prejudicial to either 
party, it avoids creating the perception that harms caused by people with 
disabilities are categorically different than harms caused by people 
without disabilities, and leaves jurors’ minds open to the possibility that 
the party with the disability is more capable than one might assume. 
VII. Counter-Arguments 
I have argued that the current rule is defensible on fairness and 
doctrinal grounds and that considering the expressive effects of each 
rule, the current rule can better serve social goals than the relaxed 
standard.  Yet, questions still remain.  Avoiding paternalism toward 
people with disabilities is one of the central projects of the disability 
rights movement, closely related to independence and autonomy.  And 
reasonable accommodations are the heart of the ADA’s 
antidiscrimination model.  The current rule that withholds the 
opportunity to seek a relaxed standard could be attacked as both 
paternalistic and as a failure to make a reasonable accommodation.  I 
address these concerns, as well as some doctrinal puzzles and the 
practical impact of the current rule, below. 
A. Disability Rights Considerations 
1. Paternalism 
Anti-paternalism, independence, and autonomy are central goals of 
the disability rights movement, but they contain complex tensions and 
contradictions.221  For example, although “self-advocacy is a revolt 
against professionals and the nonretarded world, it also, paradoxically, 
remains dependent on people who are not retarded” to facilitate and 
advise because “people with retardation often need help in making the 
choices and judgments that constitute their own acts of self-assertion.”222  
“[V]irtually all participants in the disability rights movement have 
united in their opposition to paternalism—to nondisabled people acting 
 
221. See supra Part IV.B.2. 
222. SHAPIRO, supra note 84, at 187.  
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to deny opportunities to people with disabilities ‘for their own good,’”223 
yet many people with disabilities require significant assistance from 
nondisabled individuals in their personal lives, and the disability rights 
movement relies extensively on the efforts of nondisabled lawyers, 
teachers, parents, and others to achieve its goals.224  It is too quick to 
immediately assume a rule is inconsistent with disability rights 
considerations merely because it has paternalistic elements.  There are 
situations where a somewhat paternalistic policy may be the best 
policy.225 
The few commentators who have supported the current rule have 
been criticized for employing what is seen as a paternalistic, “for-their-
own-good” justification.226  There is undoubtedly some truth to the 
criticism.  Central to this Article’s argument is the notion that 
withholding a relaxed standard and subjecting people with cognitive 
disabilities to more liability carries expressive benefits that could work 
to their advantage.  Within this argument is the admittedly paternalistic 
idea that people with cognitive disabilities will be better off if they do 
not have the choice to argue for a relaxed standard when they are 
defendants in tort suits.  However, the motivating fear is that allowing 
the relaxed standard will lead families, expert witnesses, and judges to 
paternalistically tell people with cognitive disabilities what they are 
capable of.  Thus, the desire to avoid paternalism can cut in either 
direction.227 
Antipaternalism arguments can often support either side of a debate.  
An example exists in the debate over assisted suicide.  Explaining the 
views of people who oppose assisted suicide, Bagenstos writes: 
Those critics accept that autonomy is the basic goal of the 
disability rights movement, and many agree that an autonomous 
choice to commit suicide should, in principle, be protected.  But 
they contend that if assisted suicide is allowed at all, the 
pressures will be so powerful that many people with disabilities 
 
223. BAGENSTOS, supra note 72, at 90. 
224. Id. at 4.  
225. See, e.g., Bagenstos & Schlanger, supra note 47, at 795–96 (acknowledging that their 
proposal to eliminate “damages based on . . . hedonic harms” is “paternalistic in many 
individual cases”).  
226. See Jacobi, supra note 2, at 114.  
227. Cf. BAGENSTOS, supra note 72, at 114 (“The antipaternalist principle, therefore, 
is . . . limited.  Multiple, even opposing, policy outcomes are likely to be consistent with it, and 
paternalism will sometimes be justified in any event.”).  
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will be forced to “choose” to end their lives . . . .  In those 
circumstances . . . autonomy is best served by prohibiting assisted 
suicide altogether.228 
In the context of a relaxed standard for negligence, there is a risk 
that people with cognitive disabilities could be coerced into seeking the 
protection of the standard and, therefore, forced to present themselves 
as incompetent.  If this risk (combined with the attendant risks of 
underestimation of capability, labeling, and others discussed above) 
outweighs the harm that is suffered by those people with cognitive 
disabilities who truly would prefer to be judged by a relaxed standard, 
then withholding the standard arguably is most faithful to the principles 
of autonomy and antipaternalism. 
One cannot write off a law or policy as inconsistent with disability 
rights simply because it can be construed as paternalistic.  With respect 
to the standard of care applied to people with cognitive disabilities, 
withholding the opportunity to choose a relaxed standard may be the 
more progressive option. 
2. The ADA and Reasonable Accommodation 
One commentator argues at length that courts violate the ADA by 
not allowing people with cognitive disabilities access to a relaxed 
standard.229  But the argument probably underestimates how 
significantly courts have constrained the scope of the ADA.  In Doe v. 
Mutual of Omaha Insurance Co., the plaintiffs challenged AIDS caps in 
their health insurance policies under Title III of the ADA, which 
prohibits discrimination by places of public accommodation, like 
insurance vendors.230  Judge Posner held in favor of the defendants, 
stating that “[t]he common sense of the statute is that the content of the 
goods or services offered by a place of public accommodation is not 
regulated.”231 
Bagenstos has defined this limitation “the access/content 
distinction.”232  “[C]ourts have held that an accommodation can be 
required only if it provides people with disabilities ‘access’ to the same 
 
228. BAGENSTOS, supra note 72, at 110.  
229. See Jacobi, supra note 2, at 125–36.  
230. See Doe v. Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co., 179 F.3d 557, 558–59 (7th Cir. 1999).  
231. Id. at 560 (emphasis added). 
232. See BAGENSTOS, supra note 72, at 70–72; Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Future of 
Disability Law, 114 YALE L.J. 1, 45–50 (2004).   
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benefit received by nondisabled individuals; an accommodation that 
would alter the ‘content’ of the benefit will not be required . . . .”233 
In the situation at hand, people with cognitive disabilities have 
“access” to the exact same service as people without cognitive 
disabilities (a tort system that applies the reasonable person standard), 
just as the plaintiffs in Doe had “access” to the exact same product as 
nondisabled individuals (an insurance policy with an AIDS cap).  
Allowing a relaxed standard would alter the “content” of the service so 
courts are unlikely to find the failure to accommodate violates the 
ADA. 
Doe demonstrates how dramatically the access/content distinction 
undermines the true spirit of the ADA by limiting the “reasonable 
accommodations” the law requires.234  The ADA’s vision would be 
better served if the court in Doe formulated the “content” sought more 
functionally, as an insurance policy that provided adequate coverage for 
all diseases.  One could similarly argue that the content sought by those 
arguing for a relaxed standard is a tort system that only holds parties 
responsible for harms they had the capacity to avoid.  However, 
following the reasoning in Doe, a court would likely reject this 
functional characterization.  Fortuitously, in this case, unlike in Doe, 
such formalism might lead to the optimal result. 
Just as some laws with paternalistic elements may be consistent with 
the goals of the disability rights movement, some laws that could be 
construed as failing to accommodate may do more to further those goals 
than the accommodation would.  The further the accommodation 
requirement is taken, the more it begins to look like a form of charity,235 
which can distract from some of the disability rights movement’s most 
important projects.  As I have argued throughout this Article, there are 
a number of arguments that suggest that allowing a relaxed standard is 
 
233. BAGENSTOS, supra note 72, at 71.   
234. Cf. BAGENSTOS, supra note 72, at 1 (“[M]atters have not worked out as disability 
rights advocates hoped. . . .  [T]he Supreme Court has read the statute’s provisions very 
narrowly. . . .  ADA plaintiffs lose their cases at astounding rates . . . .  The statutory 
provisions that require businesses to be accessible are wildly underenforced.  And the 
employment rate for people with disabilities has remained stagnant at best.”); JOHNSON, 
supra note 68, at xiv (“Twelve years [after the passage of the ADA], most people still do not 
understand the nature of disability discrimination.  And there is still very little public 
discussion about it.”). 
235. Cf. BAGENSTOS, supra note 72, at 51–54 (proposing the broader definition model of 
Australia’s Disability Discrimination Act as an alternative to the ADA model and explaining 
the Australian law’s limitations in empowering individuals with disabilities).  
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an accommodation we might be better off avoiding. 
B. Doctrinal Puzzles 
1. Contributory Negligence 
Many commentators have noted an apparent inconsistency in the 
standard applied to people with cognitive disabilities when they are 
plaintiffs in negligence actions, as opposed to defendants.236  Some courts 
explicitly acknowledge that they apply a different standard to a person 
with a cognitive disability if that person is a plaintiff and the issue is the 
plaintiff’s comparative negligence.237  Critics of the current rule argue 
that the courts’ treatment of plaintiffs with cognitive disabilities shows 
their discomfort with the general rule against a relaxed standard.238  On 
the other hand, the one supporter of the current rule who addressed the 
contributory negligence issue criticizes courts for what she considers an 
indefensible doctrinal inconsistency.239 
Allowing a relaxed standard for plaintiffs with cognitive disabilities 
but not defendants with cognitive disabilities may actually be a sensible 
and sustainable equilibrium, not merely a step toward allowing a 
subjective standard for all parties with cognitive disabilities (as critics of 
the rule suggest) or an indefensible and damaging inconsistency (as 
supporters of the rule suggest).  The inconsistency represents something 
of a compromise between a universal model of disability and a minority 
group model.  When the actor is a defendant, the reasonable person 
standard is applied universally and harms caused by all people are 
treated similarly.240  Not only does applying the reasonable person 
 
236. See, e.g., Dark, supra note 2, at 191 (“When the mentally disabled person is a 
plaintiff, the courts have usually taken plaintiff’s limitations due to a mental illness or mental 
disability into account.”); Harlow, supra note 2, at 1745 (“[T]he law has shifted to allow 
mental illness as a defense to contributory negligence.”). 
237. See, e.g., Mochen v. State, 352 N.Y.S.2d 290, 294 (App. Div. 1974) (“It is not 
appropriate that an injured party be foreclosed from recompense by objective notions of care 
not related in any way to his fault or to his ability to avoid fault.”).  
238. See, e.g., Dark, supra note 2, at 194 (“[T]he fact that a series of contributory 
negligence cases exist strongly suggests that courts are . . . trying, whenever possible, to 
mediate the harshness of the rule . . . .”); Harlow, supra note 2, at 1745 (arguing that allowing 
a relaxed standard as a defense to contributory negligence could “indicat[e] that perhaps the 
common law is moving towards allowing a subjective standard for defendants with mental 
illness as well”).  
239. See Splane, supra note 2, at 169–70. 
240. See Harlow, supra note 2, at 1734 (explaining that the common law “requires 
defendants in negligence actions to meet an objective ‘reasonable person’ standard to avoid 
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standard lead to just results for the injured party, it also subjects the 
person with a disability to the risks and consequences of full citizenship, 
risks that many people with cognitive disabilities are explicitly willing to 
take.241  Conversely, when the actor is a plaintiff, allowing a relaxed 
standard recognizes that people with cognitive disabilities are, as a 
group, underprivileged and subject to “prejudice, stereotypes, and 
neglect,”242 which helps justify the targeted, sympathetic treatment in 
this limited class of cases.243 
That being said, there is obvious tension in the set of arguments 
above.  If an objective standard is just and expressively beneficial when 
applied to defendants with cognitive disabilities, would it not be 
similarly just and beneficial if applied to plaintiffs with cognitive 
disabilities?  And if a subjective standard is warranted when applied to 
plaintiffs with cognitive disabilities as a limited recognition of the plight 
of an underprivileged group, why not extend the sympathetic treatment 
to cases of primary negligence? 
The current inconsistency seems to represent a compromise between 
two compelling poles.  The same arguments that favor applying an 
objective standard to defendants with cognitive disabilities do apply to 
plaintiffs with cognitive disabilities as well, but with less force.  Courts 
are motivated to apply the objective standard to defendants with 
cognitive disabilities because it seems unjust for a person who is injured 
by someone with a cognitive disability to receive no compensation.  
Courts are understandably less motivated to apply the objective 
standard to plaintiffs with cognitive disabilities because the injustice is 
less stark when the person who loses money because of the application 
of a relaxed standard is a defendant who was not injured and is at least 
partially responsible for the other party’s harm.  Similarly, while there 
could be seriously damaging stigma, stereotyping, and rejection if 
people with cognitive disabilities were not made to compensate those 
that they injure, society is unlikely to react as harshly if people with 
cognitive disabilities are treated sympathetically by the tort system when 
they are the ones who suffered injuries. 
On the other side of the scale, the arguments that favor treating 
 
liability”). 
241. See SHAPIRO, supra note 84, at 192.  
242. See BAGENSTOS, supra note 72, at 20.  
243. One might actually believe that all plaintiffs, nondisabled and disabled alike, should 
be subject to a slightly more sympathetic standard than defendants simply because it is less 
problematic for society when people put themselves at risk than when they put others at risk.  
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people with cognitive disabilities sympathetically when they are 
plaintiffs also apply when they are defendants, but they are 
overpowered by the expressive consequences that would follow and the 
unjust results that such a rule would entail for innocent injured parties.  
Further, allowing a relaxed standard across all cases would seem 
comparable to the type of charity that proponents of the social model of 
disability believe is a problematic approach to disability,244 and it would 
deny people with cognitive disabilities the “dignity of risk,” which is 
essential to many of the goals of the disability rights movement.245  If 
people with cognitive disabilities do not face the same consequences for 
the risks they take as all people do, the ideals of integration and 
independence are less likely to truly be realized. 
Despite these tensions, this Subpart shows that there could be a 
defensible explanation for the balance the tort system has struck, 
whether the judges crafting the rules were attuned to these arguments or 
not. 
2. Criminal Law and Contract Law 
Some commentators have pointed out that courts are capable of 
applying a relaxed standard because they do so in other contexts, such 
as criminal law and contract law, when they apply capacity defenses.246  
It is surely true that courts can administer doctrines that require drawing 
difficult lines.  The Restatement’s concern over whether courts could 
make these determinations consistently from case to case may be 
overblown because courts often make similar decisions with the aid of 
expert testimony.  But crucially, because of society’s general tendency to 
underestimate the competence of people with cognitive disabilities, it 
seems likely that courts would systematically be too quick to presume 
the actor could not have done any better.247 
In the criminal context, these errors are more justifiable because 
 
244. See, e.g., BAGENSTOS, supra note 72, at 18. 
245. See BAGENSTOS, supra note 72, at 26 (quoting Gerben DeJong, Defining and 
Implementing the Independent Living Concept, in INDEPENDENT LIVING FOR PHYSICALLY 
DISABLED PEOPLE 20 (Nancy M. Crewe & Irving Kenneth Zola eds., 1983)).  
246. See, e.g., Jacobi, supra note 2, at 112.  The Restatement does not overlook these 
other systems, but argues that “[t]he awkwardness experienced by the criminal-justice system 
in attempting to litigate the insanity defense” partially motivates their decision.  
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 11 
cmt. e (2010). 
247. See supra Part V.A.  
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criminal defendants face graver potential consequences (e.g., loss of 
liberty and perhaps loss of life) than defendants in negligence suits who 
face only financial consequences.  A defendant’s interest in life and 
liberty outweigh the risk of expressive harm that might accompany the 
capacity defense.  Additionally, capacity defenses are sensible in 
criminal cases because there is no individual plaintiff that is denied 
compensation by the capacity defense.  The plaintiff in a criminal case is 
the state, which ordinarily has an interest in securing a conviction only if 
the defendant is morally blameworthy.  On the other hand, an injured 
plaintiff in a tort case has the same interest in compensation whether or 
not the person that caused the harm is morally at fault.248  
Allowing a capacity defense is also justifiable in contract law.  In the 
context of contracts, parties engage with one another voluntarily, which 
raises different concerns than the negligence context.249  The capacity 
defense protects people with cognitive disabilities from parties who 
might seek them out and take advantage of them.250  There is some risk 
of unfairness to a party who unknowingly enters a bargain with a person 
with a cognitive disability, but it is mitigated.251  The Restatement 
declares that when the impaired party “is unable to act in a reasonable 
manner in relation to the transaction,” the capacity defense is only 
available if “the other party has reason to know” of the person’s 
condition.252  This is quite unlike negligence cases, where a capacity 
defense would result in serious unfairness to the other party.253 
A concern in negligence cases is that it would be advantageous to all 
defendants with a cognitive disability to argue that they are incompetent 
in order to avoid liability.254  In the contracts context, parties would only 
find themselves in this situation if they later regretted their contract.  
Thus, not only does the capacity defense work less unfairness on other 
parties in contacts than in torts, but it also imposes expressive harms on 
 
248. See supra notes 38–43. 
249. See Jay M. Feinman, Critical Approaches to Contract Law, 30 UCLA L. REV. 829, 
834 (1983). 
250. See 1 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 4.2 (2nd ed. 
1998). 
251. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 15(2) (1981). 
252. Id. § 15(1)(b).  The unimpaired party’s expectation interest is not perfectly 
protected, though.  The capacity defense is available regardless of the other party’s awareness 
if the impaired party is “unable to understand . . . the nature and consequences of the 
transaction.”  Id. § 15(1)(a). 
253. See supra Part III. 
254. See supra Part V.C. 
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a smaller proportion of the parties with cognitive disabilities.  Most 
importantly, the relaxed standard is needed in contract law to protect 
against the risk of a person taking advantage of someone with a 
cognitive disability.  This risk does not exist in the negligence context, 
where people do not choose their counter-parties. 
C. The Effects of Financial Liability 
Some may still be uncomfortable with assigning financial liability to 
a person with a cognitive disability who may truly have been incapable 
of acting differently.  To the extent that this is unjust, some comfort lies 
in the fact that many defendants may be protected by liability 
insurance.255  A homeowner’s liability insurance typically covers liability 
for negligence by the homeowner and family members.256  People with 
cognitive disabilities who live with their families may be covered this 
way.  Also, group homes and providers of supported living are required 
to carry liability insurance in some states.257  While not all people with 
cognitive disabilities will have protection through their living 
arrangements, and liability insurance does not entirely remove the 
financial burden of liability in tort, it lessens the blow dramatically for 
many.258  The result is a burden that is more proportional to the wrong. 
Further, as explained above, those who perceive it as unjust for a 
person with a cognitive disability to face financial liability for a harm he 
or she was incapable of avoiding should remember that it is the nature 
of the objective standard that a defendant is held liable for conduct that 
falls short of reasonable, regardless of whether the defendant was 
 
255. See Scott Hershovitz, Harry Potter and the Trouble with Tort Theory, 63 STAN. L. 
REV. 67, 111–12 (2010) (“[T]ort suits are often battles between an insurer that has subrogated 
the plaintiff’s claim and an insurer that that has issued a liability policy to the defendant.”).  
Hershovitz’s contention that “tort scholars should engage tort law as it is realized in the 
world, not as it looks in the pages of the Restatement” is important to keep in mind.  Id. at 
112. 
256. See, e.g., WIS. OFFICE OF THE COMM’R OF INS., PI-015, CONSUMER’S GUIDE TO 
HOMEOWNER’S INSURANCE 4 (2008), available at http://www.oci.wi.gov/pub_list/pi-015.pdf.  
257. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 400.411(6) (2004).  
258. Cf. Hershovitz, supra note 255, at 113 (“[I]n the absence of liability insurance, 
justice would not require people who are momentarily careless (e.g., by looking away from 
the road for a split second to read a billboard) to pay ‘make whole’ damages to someone they 
severely injure, because the remedy would be utterly out of proportion to the infraction.  
With liability insurance, however, justice might well demand such damages, if we are of the 
view that responsible people prepare in advance to make good any injuries their negligence 
might inflict on others.”). 
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capable of exercising reasonable care.259  This is true whether the 
defendant has a cognitive disability or not.260 
I have argued that the current rule could have positive expressive 
effects and coincide with the goals of the disability rights movement.  
One could argue, though, that assigning financial liability to people with 
cognitive disabilities will actually reduce their autonomy.  Family 
members or caretakers might restrict the freedom of people with 
cognitive disabilities for fear of liability, and insurance companies and 
employers might discriminate against people with cognitive disabilities 
because they would indirectly be affected by the financial liability.  
While the effects of the current rule are certainly ambiguous, these 
concerns may be overstated.  First, the ADA protects against blatant 
discrimination by employers or insurers.261  Second, if the current rule 
actually made caretakers and family members restrict the freedom of 
people with cognitive disabilities, one might expect to hear more 
complaints about the rule from progressive members of the disability 
rights movement.  Tort doctrine may simply not have a strong effect on 
individuals’ decisions in this context.  It should instead be viewed as part 
of a broader project of reshaping societal perceptions of people with 
cognitive disabilities. 
VIII.  CONCLUSION 
There are compelling arguments in favor of both the current rule 
and a relaxed standard.  While the question is a close one and neither 
rule is free from criticism on various levels, the balance favors retaining 
the current rule, particularly when one considers its potential for 
expressive benefits.  Unlike the often-proposed relaxed standard, the 
 
259. See Splane, supra note 2, at 168. 
260. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283B cmt. c. at 289, 290 (1965); see also 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM § 11 
cmt. e (2010). 
261. This may be a small comfort considering the aforementioned fact that “ADA 
plaintiffs lose their cases at astounding rates—the only litigants less successful than ADA 
employment plaintiffs are prisoner plaintiffs.”  BAGENSTOS, supra note 72, at 1.  The ADA 
has not nearly met expectations as a tool for social change.  See, e.g., COLKER, supra note 73, 
at 6–8.  Restrictive judicial interpretations like the one in Doe, described above, are at least 
partially to blame.  Doe v. Mut. Of Omaha Ins. Co., 179 F.3d 557 (7th Cir. 1999).  The 
literature exploring the ADA’s perceived failures is substantial.  See, e.g., Linda Hamilton 
Krieger, Foreword—Backlash Against the ADA: Interdisciplinary Perspectives and 
Implications for Social Justice Strategies, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 7 (2000) 
(surveying literature). 
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current preference for applying the reasonable person standard to 
people with cognitive disabilities at least has the potential to be 
expressively beneficial and in harmony with some of the complex goals 
of the disability rights movement. 
Unfortunately, this potential for expressive benefit is not realized 
because the most common rationales for the rule and the rhetoric 
employed by courts applying the rule entrench the stereotype that 
people with cognitive disabilities are incompetent and dangerous.  This 
stereotype increases the stigma of cognitive disability, is detrimental to 
inclusion and integration efforts, and encourages outsiders to view 
cognitive disability as a medical (rather than a social) problem that is 
completely inherent to the person with the disability.  However, because 
the expressive harms of a relaxed standard would likely be even greater 
and the concrete results less defensible on fairness and doctrinal 
grounds, the proper response is not to abandon the current rule.  
Instead, courts should retain the current rule, but modify its rationale in 
a way that is more consistent with progressive notions of cognitive 
disability and is more attuned to the expressive power of law. 
Courts should focus heavily on fairness to the injured party as a 
justification for the rule.  Courts should recognize our uncertainty about 
the capabilities of many people with cognitive disabilities and avoid 
unnecessarily labeling people with cognitive disabilities as incompetent 
by announcing that they could not have done any better.  Whether a 
party has a cognitive disability or not, the reasonable person standard 
does not ask whether the party could have done better.  Little is gained 
by a court labeling a person with a cognitive disability as incompetent 
when such a pronouncement has no impact on the outcome of the case.  
By not unnecessarily opining on the capabilities of people with cognitive 
disabilities, courts will avoid underestimating those capabilities and 
perpetuating damaging stereotypes. 
 
